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The Legislative Veto in Illinois: Why JCAR Review
of Agency Rulemaking Is Unconstitutional
Marc D. Falkoff*
This Article argues that legislative vetoes of administrative agency
rulemaking in Illinois are unlawful under the state’s constitution. It
focuses on the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (“JCAR”), a
bipartisan legislative committee that is authorized to review rules
promulgated by administrative agencies in the executive branch. Since
2004, JCAR has possessed veto power over agency rulemaking,
meaning that the committee may permanently stop implementation of
new rules upon the vote of three-fifths of its twelve members. For even
longer, the Illinois General Assembly has been authorized to block
implementation of agency rules through passage of joint resolutions,
which do not require presentment to the Governor for a potential
executive veto. The Illinois courts have not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of the legislative veto, though it has been part of the
state’s legal landscape since 1981. Legislative veto schemes have been
challenged in the federal system and in more than a dozen states. In
every instance except one, the schemes have been deemed
unconstitutional violations of separation-of-powers principles, or else
have been struck down for failing to comply with constitutional
bicameralism or presentment requirements, or both. No scheme that
grants veto power to a committee of the legislature has ever been
upheld as constitutional in any jurisdiction in the United States.
The lack of judicial resolution of the lawfulness of the legislative veto
in Illinois should not be taken to mean the scheme is uncontroversial in
the state. Indeed, it is little appreciated that Illinois recently
experienced a constitutional crisis related to JCAR vetoes. One of the
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articles of impeachment against former Governor Rod Blagojevich
alleged that he violated separation-of-powers principles by ordering
one of his administrative agencies to refuse to comply with a JCAR veto
of its rules. Blagojevich was removed from office in part because of his
refusal to accept the constitutionality of the legislative veto. This
Article argues that in fact the provisions of the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act that authorize JCAR and the General Assembly to veto
agency rulemaking are inconsistent with the separation-of-powers and
enactment provisions of the Illinois Constitution. As such, the General
Assembly should consider alternatives to the legislative veto now,
before the Illinois courts rule the current system unconstitutional and
throw the state’s rulemaking process into disarray.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that legislative vetoes of administrative agency
rulemaking in Illinois are unlawful under the state’s constitution. Since
2004, a small committee of twelve legislators—the Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules (“JCAR”)—has exercised statutory authority to
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kill rules and regulations promulgated by executive branch agencies.
For even longer, the General Assembly has held the same powers.1
Although legislative vetoes were long ago held unconstitutional in the
federal system,2 and have likewise been ruled unlawful in nearly every
state in which they have been challenged in court,3 the Illinois courts
have not yet ruled on their constitutionality under Illinois law.
When the day of reckoning comes, the Illinois Supreme Court will
have to decide whether JCAR and General Assembly vetoes accord
with separation-of-powers principles4 and whether they comply with the
state constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.5 The
time for judicial resolution of these important questions is long overdue.
The state of Illinois has already experienced something of a
constitutional crisis because the courts have offered no guidance on the
lawfulness of legislative vetoes. In 2009, Governor Rod Blagojevich
was impeached, convicted, and removed from office in part because the
General Assembly found that he had violated separation-of-powers
principles by ordering one of his administrative agencies to disregard a
JCAR veto of its rules.6 The Governor’s rationale for his order was, of
course, that legislative vetoes like those issued by JCAR were
themselves unconstitutional on the same grounds.
When JCAR was created in an overhaul of the Illinois Administrative
Procedures Act (“IAPA”) in 1977, it was designed as an oversight
committee with only modest powers.7 Broadly speaking, the function
of JCAR was to oversee the activities of the state’s burgeoning
administrative agencies, which the General Assembly had increasingly
tasked with promulgating rules to effectuate the legislature’s laws. As
was happening in the federal government and in states across the nation,
the Illinois legislature was seeking a way to retain some kind of
meaningful control over rulemaking authority that, in the interests of
efficiency, it had delegated to executive agencies.

1. Since 1981, the General Assembly has been authorized by statute to block the
implementation of agency rules by passing a joint resolution to make permanent JCAR rule
suspensions. See Act of Jan. 1, 1981, Pub. Act 81-1514, 1977 Ill. Laws 3898, discussed infra
Part I.C.
2. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54 (1983), discussed infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. The Blagojevich impeachment is discussed more fully below. See infra notes 15–32 and
accompanying text.
7. See Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. Act 79-1083, 1975 Ill. Laws 3312.
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As discussed in more detail in Part I below, JCAR was at first
authorized to do little more than keep tabs on agency rulemaking. The
committee was to review newly proposed rules, consult with the
promulgating agencies when it had concerns about the rules, and
recommend legislative action to the General Assembly if informal
discussion with the agencies failed to allay its concerns. Though JCAR
could register its discontent with rules and regulations proposed by
agencies, neither the General Assembly nor JCAR had authority to
unilaterally keep those rules from going into effect.
By its own account, JCAR’s “inform-and-advise” authority was
initially effective, and had a substantial impact on agency rulemaking. 8
But almost immediately JCAR sought more power over agency
rulemaking for both itself and the General Assembly. In 1980, the
General Assembly passed into law (over a gubernatorial veto) a statute
that authorized JCAR to suspend operation of new agency rules by a
three-fifths vote of the committee, and for the General Assembly to
make the suspension permanent by passage of a joint resolution.9
Thereafter, anytime JCAR expressed unease about a new rule, the
administrative agency that promulgated it would endeavor to allay
JCAR’s concerns in order to lessen the likelihood of a General
Assembly veto. According to JCAR’s Annual Report for 1981, during
the first year in which the veto was available to the General Assembly,
“virtually all” of the rules that JCAR reviewed were modified by the
promulgating agencies in response to JCAR comments.10
In 2004, JCAR was granted statutory authority to issue its own
veto.11 Pursuant to amendments to the IAPA, a JCAR objection and
suspension of a proposed rule would no longer expire if the General
Assembly failed to pass a joint resolution making the suspension
permanent.12 Instead, a JCAR suspension would become permanent

8. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 17–18 (1979) [hereinafter 1978 JCAR REPORT] (noting that in its first functioning
year, JCAR reviewed nearly five hundred proposed agency rules, found “serious problems” with
more than one-third of them, but informal discussion and the threat of corrective legislation had
led to the resolution of most of the committee’s concerns). All of JCAR annual reports are now
accessible online at INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/ (search in search bar for “Illinois
Joint Committee on Administrative Rules Annual Report”) (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
9. Act of Jan. 1, 1981, Pub. Act 81-1514, 1977 Ill. Laws 3898.
10. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 110 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 JCAR REPORT].
11. 100 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115(c) (2016).
12. Id.
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unless the General Assembly passed a joint resolution overriding it.13
The effect was to turn a General Assembly veto (which at least had the
virtues of requiring bicameral majority support) into a legislative
committee veto that could be exercised by a group of just eight
legislators (three-fifths of the twelve-member body).14
Both forms of legislative veto—the one possessed solely by the
General Assembly until 2004 and the one possessed by JCAR since
then—raise serious questions about whether separation-of-powers
principles are being respected in the state and about whether the
exercise of such vetoes is in accord with Illinois constitutional
requirements for the enactment of laws. The constitutional concerns
raised by the veto power, although long simmering without resolution,
are of deep importance to the state and have in fact already resulted in a
largely unnoticed constitutional crisis.
It is widely known that in 2009 Governor Rod Blagojevich was
impeached, convicted, and removed from office by the General
Assembly following allegations he had, in the words of the House of
Representatives’ Article of Impeachment, sought “to obtain a personal
benefit in exchange for his appointment to fill [Barack Obama’s] vacant
seat in the United States Senate.”15 Less appreciated is that one of the
particular articles against Blagojevich included the charge he had
“abused the power of his office” by his “refusal to recognize the
authority of the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules to suspend or
prohibit rules, [and] his utter disregard of the doctrine of separation of
powers.”16 Given the doubtful constitutionality of the state’s legislative
veto scheme, the accusation was ironic in the extreme.
The contretemps arose after the Illinois Department of Health and

13. Id.
14. A JCAR suspension of a rule still requires a three-fifths vote of the committee. Id.
15. H.R. Res. 5, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at art. I(1) (Ill. 2008). Governor Blagojevich
was also tried in federal court on charges related to wire fraud, attempted extortion, conspiracy to
commit extortion, soliciting bribes, and conspiracy to solicit and accept bribes. Summary of
Charges at 72, United States v. Blagojevich, No. 08-CR-888 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2011). He was
initially convicted on one count in August 2010, with the jury deadlocked on the remaining
twenty-four. Bob Secter et al., Blagojevich Convicted on 1 of 24 Counts, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17,
2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-08-18/news/ct-met-blagojevich-verdict-2010081
71_attorney-reid-schar-lone-conviction-sam-adam. Upon retrial, he was convicted of another
seventeen counts. Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Jury Finds Blagojevich Guilty of
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A1. In July 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit vacated the convictions on five counts and affirmed the remaining convictions.
United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 743 (7th Cir. 2015).
16. Ill. Res. 5, at art. I(9).
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Family Services (“Family Services”) issued a set of emergency rules
raising the cut-off rate for Medicaid eligibility in the state to 400% of
the federal poverty level.17 The agency, relying on the Illinois Public
Aid Code,18 had promulgated the rules in part because of concern that a
generous federal reimbursement program for a different state insurance
program—the Children’s Health Insurance Protection Act19—would
soon be discontinued.
The IAPA required that the rules from Family Services be submitted
to JCAR for review.20 JCAR objected to the rules, and suspended their
implementation, on the grounds that there was no pending emergency
and that the rules were contrary to the public interest. 21 The Secretary
of State accordingly refused to publish them.22
With the consent of Governor Blagojevich, Family Services ignored
JCAR suspension, sued the Secretary of State to force him to publish
the rules, and put the rules into effect.23 A taxpayer suit soon followed,
in which the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent implementation
of the agency’s rule and a cessation of the enrollment of adults into
Medicaid under the new eligibility standard.24
Neither the trial court nor the intermediate appellate court reached the
question of whether a General Assembly veto would have been
constitutional had it been issued, nor did they determine whether the
temporary suspension of the Medicaid rules that resulted from JCAR’s
objection raised constitutional concerns. Instead, the courts concluded
that Family Services had misconstrued the Illinois Public Aid Code and
did not have the statutory authority to promulgate rules expanding
insurance coverage to the degree that it had attempted.25 It is
impossible to know whether the Illinois Supreme Court would have
reached the “legislative veto” questions that hovered in this matter,
17. The facts of the dispute are taken from Caro ex rel. State v. Blagojevich, 895 N.E.2d 1091,
1094–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
18. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2(2)(b) (2016).
19. State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa–1397jj (2012).
20. Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 to 110/15-10 (2016).
21. Caro, 895 N.E.2d at 1095.
22. Id.
23. See Associated Press, Blagojevich Ups Ante in Dispute with Lawmakers, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Apr. 3, 2008, at C4 (“The governor’s Department of Healthcare and Family Services
has filed a suit to force Secretary of State Jesse White, a fellow Democrat, to publish rules
allowing the expansion of the state’s Family Care program for Illinoisans who can’t afford private
insurance.”).
24. Caro, 895 N.E.2d at 1095.
25. Id. at 1095–96 (discussing the trial court’s rulings).
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because the case was settled by then-Governor Patrick Quinn soon after
Blagojevich was removed from office.26
The ultimate fate of the rules on Medicaid eligibility is of less
concern for purposes of this Article than the fact that impeachment
charges were filed against Blagojevich because of the dispute, which
was arguably more about the political advisability of expanding
Medicaid coverage than about the authority of Family Services to issue
the rules in the first place.27 Hidden in plain sight, the General
Assembly and the Governor were engaged in a battle royale over
whether legislative vetoes of executive agency activity were lawful.
Governor Blagojevich addressed the charge that he had disregarded
separation-of-powers principles during his trial before the Senate. He
noted that nine other states had committees like JCAR that were ruled
unconstitutional.28 He stated that he had “respected” JCAR since he
had been Governor, but that he understood JCAR to be constitutionally
limited to providing advice to the executive branch:
But I’ve been given legal advice by lawyers and I believe they’re
right, and other courts have agreed that those lawyers were right, that
JCAR is an advisory committee, that it cannot dictate to the executive
branch. That if the executive branch seeks to do something, that
committee can advise you and suggest whether it’s right or wrong, or
they agree with you or not, but they can’t stop you.29

Governor Blagojevich then explained how he viewed the separationof-powers equation playing out:
If you want to stop the executive branch under our Constitution and
the ideas of separation of powers, then you all know how it works.
The House passes a bill, you in the Senate pass a bill. I may not like
it. You send it to me, I veto that bill, it goes back to you, and then you
override my veto.
That’s how you stop the executive branch and a governor. But 12
lawmakers, however—however intelligent and honest and impressive
and schooled as you may be, 12 lawmakers picked by a—by
26. See John O’Connor, Quinn, Businessmen Settle Suit on Health Care, MY WEB TIMES
(June 22, 2009), http://www.mywebtimes.com/news/illinois_ap/quinn-businessmen-settle-suit-on
-health-care/article_189bcd7f-fbc8-53ba-ab38-00ed93d7fe6e.html.
27. The position of the House of Representatives on the lawfulness of Governor Blagojevich’s
refusal to respect JCAR objections to his agency’s rules can be found in the final report of the
House’s special investigative committee concerning the Blagojevich impeachment. See ILL.
H.R., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE 29–36 (2009).
28. See 4 S., Impeachment Tribunal Transcripts of Governor Rod R. Blagojevich, 96th Gen.
Assemb., at 597 (Ill. Jan. 29. 2009) (statement of Governor Rod R. Blagojevich).
29. Id. at 596.
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legislative leaders cannot constitutionally thwart the executive branch.
Nine states have challenged this case, and in all nine states the right of
the executive branch to do what it sought to do without the consent of
JCAR was upheld.30

Notwithstanding his arguments, Governor Blagojevich was in fact
convicted of this charge (among others) by the Senate and removed
from office.31 It may be that the Illinois Supreme Court will ultimately
rule that the legislative veto is unconstitutional in the state, but in the
meantime the General Assembly has done more than shoot across the
bow at the executive branch.32 It has already scored a direct hit and
taken its first victim.
In this Article, I argue that the current JCAR rules-review scheme,
which allows the small committee to veto agency regulations, is almost
surely going to be deemed unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme
Court when the issue is squarely presented in an appropriate case.
There is no way to predict when the issue will present itself to the high
court. Political considerations, for example, may persuade a sitting
Governor against challenging JCAR’s authority, as the impeachment
proceedings against Governor Blagojevich suggest. And standing
issues may impede access to the courts for persons or corporations who
believe they have been harmed by the failure of an agency to follow
through with proposed regulations. But eventually the issue will be
before the court, and an academic treatment of the legislative veto’s
legitimacy in Illinois, one of its last redoubts, is long overdue. 33
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the origins and
evolving powers of JCAR since its creation by statute in 1977. Over the
course of several decades, JCAR has grown from an inform-and-advise
body to a committee that can kill agency regulations by a vote of eight
of its twelve members. Part II surveys legal challenges to legislative
veto schemes in the federal and state governments. With one exception,

30. Id. at 596–97.
31. S., Judgment of Conviction and Disqualification, In the Matter of the Impeachment of Rod
R. Blagojevich, Governor of the State of Illinois, 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. Jan. 29, 2009).
32. Although the public may not have focused on the article of impeachment relating to JCAR
and the legislative veto, the legislators did. See, e.g., H.R., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 7th Sess., at 9 (Ill. Feb. 4, 2009) (statement of Rep. Black) (“You just removed a
Governor because he said, I don’t care what the rules are. I don’t care what JCAR says, I’m not
going to do that.”).
33. The constitutionality of legislative vetoes in other states have been the subject of much
scholarly attention. See Kenneth D. Dean, Legislative Veto of Administrative Rules in Missouri:
A Constitutional Virus, 57 MO. L. REV. 1157, 1157 n.9 (1992) (listing academic articles).
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every court to have reviewed the constitutionality of legislative vetoes
over rules promulgated by administrative agencies has concluded that
the legislative veto is unlawful. Most often the problem is a failure to
comply with bicameralism or presentment requirements, though
sometimes the courts find that legislatures violated separation-ofpowers principles by infringing on the authority of the executive or
judicial departments. Part III draws on the legal opinions canvassed in
the previous Part to assess the constitutionality of JCAR and General
Assembly vetoes in Illinois. It concludes that in time the Illinois
Supreme Court will almost surely rule that the legislative veto is
unlawful. Part IV offers some thoughts on alternatives to the current
JCAR system that would be more likely to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. The Article concludes with a recommendation that the
General Assembly modify the current statutory scheme before the
Illinois Supreme Court is compelled to rule on its constitutionality.
I. ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF JCAR
The rise of the administrative state and the establishment of a “fourth
branch” of government is a defining feature of our modern republic.
Since the New Deal, both Congress and state legislatures have created
myriad administrative agencies in the executive branch, delegating to
these agencies authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
effectuate their legislative goals. To be sure, legislatures have the
authority to create their own rules through their lawmaking powers. But
it is universally acknowledged that the legislative process is too
cumbersome, and that legislators’ expertise is too uneven, to expect
legislative bodies to pass laws with the “requisite specificity to cover
endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape.”34
Agencies, in contrast, are in theory staffed with experts who can craft
rules appropriate to make the legislative vision a practical reality. And
agency rulemaking is a more nimble and efficient process than
legislation. Finally, federal and state courts have uniformly held that
the legislative delegation of rulemaking power to administrative
agencies may be done without violating separation-of-powers
principles.
But the legislative delegation of rulemaking authority for purposes of
expertise and efficiency comes at a price. Once executive agencies are
34. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1183 (1999).
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authorized to promulgate rules, the legislature can effectively be frozen
out of the rulemaking process.35 Like Apollo handing his chariot’s
reins to Phaethon, the legislature may find itself powerless to corral
agency action it deems misguided, counterproductive, or ultra vires.
Unsurprisingly, state and federal legislatures want to keep the
benefits that attend the delegation of rulemaking authority to agencies,
but also want to retain as much control over the promulgated rules as
possible. Lawsuits seeking injunctions against the implementation of
agency rules are always possible, as is the tool of corrective legislation.
But such measures are time consuming and expensive. Moreover, their
success is uncertain, as a judge may find no merit to the legislature’s
claims of agency overreach, or the chief executive may choose to veto
the legislature’s attempts at corrective action.
Illinois, like the other states in the union, has experimented with a
variety of ways to bring meaningful oversight to agency rulemaking.
Over the course of four decades, such oversight has evolved from
establishing JCAR as an inform-and-advise committee for the review of
agency rulemaking, to the authorization of veto powers for the General
Assembly, and finally to the granting of veto powers to JCAR itself.
A. The JCAR “Inform-and-Advise” Era, 1975–1980
By the mid-1970s, Illinois had sixty-five major administrative
agencies and nearly 250 smaller boards and commissions. 36 To manage
the “complex, duplicative and chaotic” sprawl,37 the General Assembly
passed the IAPA in 1975.38 Like the federal Administrative Procedure
Act,39 the IAPA established procedures for the conduct of
administrative proceedings, for the promulgation of rules and
regulations,40 for administrative adjudication, and for licensing and rate35. L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies:
Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 86–87 (1982).
36. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 447 (1986); see also id. (“Indeed, [by the mid-1970s], no single source could produce
a complete organization chart or even a listing of all Illinois agencies, boards and commissions”).
37. Id.
38. Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. Act 79-1083, 1975 Ill. Laws 3312 (codified as
amended at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 to 15-10).
39. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2012)).
40. Under the IAPA, a “rule” is “each agency statement of general applicability that
implements, applies, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.” 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-70 (2016)
Unless otherwise noted in the text, the terms “rules” and “regulations” will be used
interchangeably in this article. Cf. S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 538 (Ill. App. Ct.
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making.41
Two years later, as part of an overhaul of the IAPA, the General
Assembly created JCAR.42 As JCAR itself explained in its first annual
report to the General Assembly, the committee was established in
response to the state’s “increasing reliance on and power of
administrative agencies to fulfill vital functions of the state,” and out of
concern that agencies “have obscured the traditional notion of
separation of powers.”43 Although the need for agency rulemaking
remained unquestioned, the sheer volume of rules—matching or
exceeding the number of statutory laws in Illinois—was perceived as a
threat to the General Assembly’s ability to ensure that the limits of the
statutory authority it had provided to agencies were respected.44
The composition of JCAR was to be twelve members of the General
Assembly, with three each chosen by the majority and minority leaders
of the House and Senate.45 Broadly speaking, its functions were twofold: to promote “adequate and proper” rulemaking by agencies, and to
promote “understanding on the part of the public respecting such
rules.”46 JCAR was thus best understood as a watchdog committee
designed in large part to assure that rulemaking was accomplished in a
transparent and politically accountable fashion.
Most importantly, JCAR was responsible for reviewing all new rules
proposed by administrative agencies.47 This review had to take place
promptly after promulgation of a proposed rule.48 JCAR was required
to assess whether the agency had acted within its statutory authority
when promulgating the rule, whether the rule was in proper form, and
whether sufficient notice had been given to the public prior to the rule’s

2002) (stating that “rules . . . are synonymous with regulations” (citing United Consumers Club,
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 456 N.E.2d 856, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983))); Granite City Div. of Nat’l Steel
Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719, 729 (Ill. 1993) (holding that the agency had
“rulemaking authority to promulgate these regulations”).
41. The IAPA was amended in 1977 to make all agencies subject to its rulemaking
requirements. Until its amendment, section 2 of the IAPA exempted agencies from compliance
with the Act unless the law that created the agency expressly stated that it was to conform to the
Act. Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3040.
42. Id.
43. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3045.
46. Id. at 3046.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3047.
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adoption.49 If JCAR had any concerns, it was initially to inform the
agency, which would then have to respond to JCAR indicating whether
it had elected to modify the proposed rule, withdraw it altogether, or
leave it unchanged.50 If the agency refused to amend or withdraw the
rule—or if it refused to respond to JCAR at all, which apparently would
happen on occasion51—JCAR was authorized to propose corrective
legislation to the General Assembly.52
JCAR had other duties as well—all designed to be part and parcel of
its role as a body to gather information and make recommendations to
the full legislature. Among its other significant responsibilities, the
committee was to engage in a “systematic and continuing study of the
rules and rule-making processes of all state agencies . . . for the purpose
of improving the rule-making process” and eliminating redundancies in
the rules.53 JCAR was tasked with establishing a review program to
study the impact of legislative changes, court rulings, and administrative
action on agency rules and rulemaking.54 JCAR was also expected to
engage in a periodic review, at least every five years, of the rules of
each agency, examining the economic and budgetary effects of the rules
and ways they might be made more efficient.55
As originally conceived, JCAR had no coercive authority over
administrative agencies, and possessed “advisory powers only relating
to its function.”56 Neither JCAR nor the General Assembly could
modify, delay, or stop the implementation of rules that either body

49. Id. JCAR further interpreted this statutory provision to authorize review of (1) the
agency’s legal authority to promulgate its rule; (2) the agency’s compliance with legislative
intent; (3) the agency’s compliance with state and federal constitutional requirements and other
law; (4) the agency’s statement of justification and rationale for the proposed rulemaking; (5)
anticipated economic effects of the proposed rulemaking; (6) clarity of the language of the
proposed rulemaking; (7) sufficient completeness and clarity to insure meaningful guidelines and
standards in the exercise of agency discretion; (8) redundancies, grammatical deficiencies, and
technical errors in the proposed rulemaking; and (9) compliance of the agency with the
requirements of the IAPA. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 344 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 JCAR REPORT].
50. Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3047.
51. See 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 149 (noting the “lack of responsiveness of
agencies to the objections issued by the Committee,” and that an “increased number of agencies
were refusing to withdraw or modify proposed rulemakings in response to objections issued by
the Joint Committee”).
52. Act of Sept. 27, 1977, Pub. Act 80-1035, 1977 Ill. Laws 3047–48.
53. Id. at 3046–47.
54. Id. at 3047.
55. Id. at 3049.
56. Id. at 3046 (emphasis added).
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deemed unlawful or unauthorized by statute, except through the
ordinary legislative process.
Nonetheless, in the first years of its existence, the JCAR scheme
showed promising signs it was improving administrative agency
rulemaking. As already noted, JCAR reviewed hundreds of new rules
from administrative agencies in its first year of operation, found
“serious problems” with more than one-third of them, but was able to
resolve its concerns in most instances through informal interaction with
the agencies.57 Only 15% of the proposed rules it reviewed required
formal action from JCAR.58 The committee reported there was a
“desire of agencies to change rules to correct serious problems and also
the extent of those issues where serious problems were unresolved
without formal Joint Committee action.”59
In 1979, JCAR reviewed over five hundred more new rules, resolving
many of their concerns through cooperation with the agencies and
objecting in only sixty-five instances.60 Among other activities, JCAR
initiated a five-year comprehensive review of rules of all agencies,
worked with the Secretary of State to develop a uniform system for the
codification of all state agency rules in Illinois, and saw most of its
twenty recommendations for new legislation passed by the General
Assembly.61 In its self-assessment, JCAR concluded that its activities
had made “a significant impact on agency-made law in Illinois,” and
that it had “fulfill[ed] an important systematic substantive oversight
function for the Illinois General Assembly.”62
JCAR initially praised the wisdom of the General Assembly in
granting it only inform-and-advise powers, explaining that the review
scheme “was designed to insure the integrity of both the administrative
rulemaking process and the proper legislative process of lawmaking.”63
B. The General Assembly Veto Era, 1981–2004
But notwithstanding public claims to its efficacy, even early in its
57. See 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 17–18. JCAR Annual Reports are a useful
resource for the public. Other states lack the transparency that such reporting provides. See, e.g.,
Dean, supra note 38, at 1165 (noting the lack of transparency that attends the work of a similar
legislative review committee in Missouri).
58. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
59. Id.
60. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 3.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 11.
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tenure JCAR began to bristle at the statutory constraints that had been
imposed on it. Although the committee had gotten traction with some
agencies, others “refused to modify the rulemaking in response to the
Joint Committee’s objections.”64 Without some kind of coercive power
over the agencies, JCAR’s comments on proposed rules could be
ignored with impunity. The perception among some legislators,
staffers, and legislative observers at the time was that JCAR had, in
reality, “little control” over administrative agencies.65
During its second year of existence, JCAR prepared a staff paper,
titled Alternatives for Strengthening Legislative Review of
Administrative Rules in Illinois, suggesting various ways in which its
supervisory powers, along with those of the General Assembly, could
be enhanced.66 The report included a review of systems in other states,
noting that many had lodged limited veto powers in legislative review
committees like JCAR.67
Enhanced powers were desirable, according to JCAR, because the
current inform-and-advise process was not sufficiently nimble to bring
about timely modification of objectionable rules from recalcitrant
agencies. Amendment by legislation was a lengthy process, and the
contested rules would remain in effect pending the successful
completion of the legislative process.68 In addition, rule modification
through legislation was inadvisable where specific areas of regulation
were “too technical or complex” or where JCAR’s objections were “of
such a nature that corrective changes in statutory language” might be
“extremely complex and could result in harmful overspecificity in the
statutory language.”69
In its 1979 staff paper, JCAR proposed nine alternatives to the
current regime—changes ranging from the constitutionally
unobjectionable, like enhancing the committee’s authority to comment
on proposed rules’ economic impact,70 to the constitutionally
implausible, like authorizing JCAR to compel an agency to promulgate

64. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 121.
65. CHRISTOPHER Z. MOONEY & TIM STOREY, THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1992–
2003: LEADERSHIP CONTROL, CONTINUITY, AND PARTNERSHIP 38 (2004).
66. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 389–96 (“JCAR Staff Paper: Alternatives for
Strengthening Legislative Review of Administrative Rules in Illinois”).
67. Id. at 389–91.
68. Id. at 392.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 394.
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a rule.71 The full set of suggestions from the staff paper will be
discussed later in this Article.72
In the end, JCAR sought General Assembly approval for a pair of
alternatives to the extant inform-and-advise approach. The first would
have removed the presumption of validity accorded to administrative
rules in court challenges if JCAR formally objected to a rule and the
agency failed to modify or withdraw it.73 The status quo was that a rule
promulgated by an agency would be presumed to be a lawful exercise of
the agency’s statutory powers.74
The threat of reversing the
presumption would, it was thought, provide incentive for the agency to
be responsive to JCAR comments rather than risk judicial disapproval
of the rule.75 The proposal was passed by both Houses of the General
Assembly in 1979, but was vetoed by the Governor—on the ground that
it violated separation-of-powers principles—and did not become law.76
The second proposal was far more ambitious. At JCAR’s urging, the
General Assembly considered authorizing JCAR to veto agency rules
that it determined constituted a serious threat to the public interest,
safety, or welfare.77 The veto would be permanent unless the General
Assembly passed a joint resolution overturning it.78
In its staff paper, JCAR acknowledged that a proposal of this type
“would result in the most serious legal issues,” including “whether
passage of a resolution can affect law, since it eliminates the approval of
the Governor required under normal legislative lawmaking.”79
Admitting that the proposal “could raise constitutional questions about
separation of powers,”80 JCAR staff nonetheless concluded the
approach was defensible because the legislature was “merely

71. Id. at 396 (“Very serious constitutional questions could be raised about this alternative.”).
72. See infra Part IV.
73. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 393–94.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act includes a similar burden-reversing
provision. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 3-204 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1981);
see also David S. Neslin, Comment, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Gubernatorial and
Legislative Review of Agency Rulemaking Under the 1981 Model Act, 57 WASH. L. REV. 669,
686 (1982) (discussing “reversed burden of persuasion” schemes).
76. The Senate subsequently overrode the veto, but the measure did not receive the three-fifth
vote needed for an override in the House. See 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 122.
77. The veto could be issued either before a rule became effective or within sixty days of its
implementation. See id. at 159 (“Recommended Bill Two”).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 396.
80. Id. at 395.
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conditioning” its delegation of rulemaking authority to the agencies.81
“Of course,” the paper languidly concluded, “a court may view the issue
differently.”82
This JCAR veto provision was considered by the General Assembly
in 1979 but was never brought to a vote.83 As discussed below,
however, it would become law nearly a quarter century later.84
In 1980, the General Assembly did pass a reform measure,
authorizing for the first time a legislative veto over agency rulemaking.
Described by JCAR as a “cooling off” provision for “improper agency
rules,”85 the statute allowed JCAR to “prohibit” and thereby delay the
implementation of new rules (or to “suspend” the effect of emergency
rules) for up to 180 days. JCAR prohibitions and suspensions were
authorized upon a finding, by a three-fifths vote of the committee, that
the rules were “objectionable” under standards laid out elsewhere in the
IAPA,86 and that they “constitute[d] a serious threat to the public
interest, safety or welfare.”87 Although the prohibition or suspension
was temporary, the General Assembly could make either permanent
through passage of a joint resolution.88
In its 1980 Annual Report, JCAR denied that the new statute
authorized a “legislative veto” over agency rulemaking.89 But that
claim was misleading, if not disingenuous. Under the new law, the
General Assembly possessed the power to permanently prevent
implementation of administrative agency rules through the passage of a
joint resolution that did not need to proceed through the usual
constitutional requirements for passage of a bill, and that did not need to
be presented to the Governor for a possible veto.90 In other words, the
81. Id. at 394.
82. Id. The Staff Paper also noted that one effect of this proposal might be that agencies
would evade JCAR altogether by simply not filing its rules and thereby pushing rulemaking
underground. Id. Under these circumstances, the public would have difficulty determining
whether to hold the agency or JCAR responsible for the substance of the rule. In addition, the
staff noted that JCAR could “continue to disclaim actual responsibility for the substance of rule
[sic], . . . but it is problemmatic [sic] whether the general public would actually distinguish
between this veto power and an actual approval power.” Id. at 395.
83. H.R. 1503, 81st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1979).
84. See infra Part I.C.
85. 1980 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 1.
86. Act of Jan. 1, 1981, Pub. Act 81-1514, 1977 Ill. Laws 3898 (modifying sections 7.04,
7.05, 7.07, and 7.08 of the IAPA).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 1980 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 109.
90. In order for a bill to become law in Illinois, it must among other things be presented to the
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General Assembly now indisputably possessed a legislative veto.
Unsurprisingly, the Governor vetoed the bill after it was presented to
him by the General Assembly. He argued that it “constitute[d] a serious
and unwarranted intrusion by the General Assembly and one of its
committees into areas properly reserved to the executive and judicial
branches of government,” that it “would violate the separation and
delegation of powers provision in the Illinois Constitution, and would
seriously jeopardize the fair and orderly processes of government in
Illinois.”91 This time, though, the General Assembly overrode the
Governor’s veto.
In its Annual Report for 1980, JCAR assured the public that the new
powers shared by it and the General Assembly were “entirely proper,”
even though “legal arguments about the constitutionality of these
provisions is likely to continue for some time.”92 Strangely, though,
constitutional arguments about the lawfulness of the General Assembly
veto have not often been raised in the courts. In fact, the Illinois courts
have not yet ruled on the constitutionality of either the General
Assembly veto or of the pure JCAR veto (its successor, which will be
discussed in the next Section).
By its own account, JCAR was not shy about flexing its new muscle.
JCAR’s objections to new rules were now backed by the threat of a
permanent suspension by the General Assembly if its concerns were not
remedied by the promulgating agency. Unsurprisingly, agencies grew
more responsive to the committee, though a superficial glance at the
numbers might hide this fact.
In 1981, JCAR reviewed more than six hundred proposed rules,93 and
formally objected to only thirty of them. This ratio of objections to
rules might seem low, at least compared with the prior few years. But
JCAR noted that “virtually all of the rules” it looked at “were changed
in some way by the Committee’s review.”94 Agencies, it seemed, were
more responsive to JCAR comments after passage of the amendatory
statute, because any residual JCAR discontent with the agency’s
rulemaking could now, with some ease, lead to the permanent quashing
of the new rule. JCAR, of course, was satisfied that this new power
Governor for a possible executive veto. ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 9. For a full discussion of the state
constitutional requirements for lawmaking, see infra Part III.B.
91. 1980 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 110 (quoting Governor James R. Thompson).
92. Id. at 111.
93. 1981 JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 28.
94. 1981 JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 6 (emphasis added).
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“significantly strengthened” the impact of its review process and would
enhance its effectiveness moving forward.95
JCAR’s first use of its prohibition powers came swiftly in 1981,
when it blocked implementation of a proposed set of rules from the
Illinois Health Finance Authority (“IHFA”) that would have regulated
the financial management of hospitals.96 The status quo that the IHFA
sought to change had hospitals determining the rates for their services
retrospectively, after they had delivered services to patients and
computed costs. The IHFA rules would instead have mandated
prospective rate-setting, pursuant to which the IHFA would approve in
advance the amount of revenue a hospital could generate each year.
JCAR filed a prohibition on implementation of the rule, finding that
the IHFA had adopted an “improper definition” of the term “hospital
services” that would result in a discontinuation of services and a “threat
to the welfare of Illinois citizens”; that forcing hospitals to fill out the
required reports would “pose a serious threat to the interests of
consumers of health care”; that the IFHA’s promulgation of the rules at
the same time it was negotiating payer differentials “pose[d] a serious
threat to the interest of Illinois citizens by raising private insurance
premium rates”; and that the IHFA’s promulgation of the rules while
negotiating with the federal government over grants of contingent
liability “will cause increased costs and/or decreased quality of care and
pose a serious threat to Illinois Citizens.”97
The justifications offered by JCAR for its first act of prohibition are
laid out here to make a couple of points. First, the fact that JCAR used
its power to prohibit the immediate implementation of a set of rules
within months of receiving statutory authority to do so was a signal to
agencies that the weapon would not sit unused. Second, JCAR swiftly
adopted a broad understanding of its authority to prohibit or suspend
new rules, which by statute could only be used where the proposed rules
“would constitute a serious threat to the public interest, safety, or
welfare.”98 There is no definition in the statute of what would
constitute a “serious” threat, including whether economic impact of
some sort alone can meet that standard. But at least three and perhaps
all four of the justifications that JCAR offered for prohibiting the

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 28.
1981 JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 31–32.
Id.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(a) (2016).
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IHFA’s rules were fundamentally economic in nature.
Unsurprisingly, the IHFA revised its proposed rules following JCAR
prohibition rather than face the prospect of passage of a General
Assembly joint resolution that would have made the suspension
permanent. The IHFA and other agencies were learning, in short, that
JCAR was now a force and that its objections had to be addressed.
Over the course of the roughly two decades during which JCAR had
the authority to prohibit or suspend the implementation of rules subject
to the prohibition or suspension becoming permanent by a General
Assembly joint resolution, JCAR found it necessary to exercise this
power just a few dozen times. Between 1981 and the end of 2003,
JCAR was responsible for reviewing fully 12,395 proposed general
rules from state agencies99 and 1867 emergency rules.100 During this
period, the committee filed only thirty-nine prohibitions or suspensions
from among these 14,262 proposed agency rules.101
The small number of prohibitions and suspensions may be evidence
that administrative agencies took the threat of a JCAR suspension and
subsequent General Assembly joint resolution seriously. Most rules
were modified or withdrawn after JCAR comment, before JCAR had to
issue a suspension. When the committee did suspend a rule, the in
terrorem value of a looming joint resolution almost always led to
agency capitulation.
In the fifteen years between 1981 and 1995, every one of the nineteen
JCAR suspensions led to the promulgating agency either modifying its
rule in accord with JCAR’s wishes or else withdrawing its rule
altogether.102 During the following nine years, between 1996 and 2004,
JCAR suspended proposed rules nineteen times, with the promulgating
agencies “voluntarily” modifying or withdrawing their rules in ten of
those instances. Of the remaining nine suspended rules—where the
99. These numbers can be reconstructed by from statistical tables in JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN.
RULES, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 69 (2014) [hereinafter
2013 JCAR REPORT] (showing 13,940 proposed general rules between 1978 and 2003); 1980
JCAR REPORT, supra note 10, at 24 (showing 563 proposed general rules in 1980); 1979 JCAR
REPORT, supra note 49, at 21 (showing 475 proposed general rules in 1979); and 1978 JCAR
REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 (showing 507 proposed general rules in 1978).
100. These numbers can be reconstructed from statistical tables in 2013 JCAR REPORT, supra
note 99, at 73 (showing 2079 proposed emergency rules between 1978 and 2003); 1980 JCAR
REPORT, supra note 49, at 24 (showing ninety-seven proposed emergency rules in 1980); 1979
JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 21 (showing 102 proposed emergency rules in 1979); and 1978
JCAR REPORT, supra note 8, at 21 (showing 133 proposed emergency rules in 1978).
101. 2013 JCAR REPORT, supra note 99, at 58–60.
102. Id. at 58–59.
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agencies girded themselves for a confrontation with the General
Assembly—JCAR withdrew its objections in six instances (though all
involved a single set of rules by a single agency) and the General
Assembly refused to pass a joint resolution making JCAR suspensions
permanent in three instances.
In short, agency pushback against JCAR was successful only a
handful of times between 1981 and 2004, when JCAR suspensions
could be enforced by a General Assembly veto. Rational agency actors
clearly understood that their proposed rules would survive JCAR review
only if they modified them to JCAR’s satisfaction.103
C. The JCAR Veto Era, 2004–Present
JCAR’s powers grew even stronger in the summer of 2004, when the
General Assembly again revised the IAPA. For more than two decades,
JCAR’s suspension authority had assured the committee possessed a
powerful, coercive tool to wield against administrative agencies. But
the suspension still required General Assembly approval within 180
days in order to become permanent.
The 2004 statutory amendment inaugurated a sea change. Moving
forward, a JCAR prohibition or suspension of an agency’s rule would
become permanent unless the General Assembly voted by joint
resolution (within six months) to reverse it.104 In other words, JCAR
could now presumptively veto any new agency rule. The General
Assembly was voting to hand over its legislative veto power to JCAR,
“empowering the Members of JCAR who are appointed to serve on that
body, to act on their behalf, as their representatives.”105 The floor
debate in the House on the measure indicated that at least some
members understood that this legislation would be a “fundamental
change in the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative
branches,”106 although to be fair the “fundamental change” really had

103. See Neslin, supra note 75, at 690 n.128 (noting that “[a]gencies usually withdraw or
modify rules to meet committee objections,” and citing sources).
104. 100 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115(c)(2016) (stating that after JCAR objects to a proposed rule,
“any member of the General Assembly may introduce in the General Assembly a joint resolution
stating that the General Assembly desires to discontinue the prohibition against the proposed rule,
amendment, or repealer or the portion thereof to which the statement was issued being filed and
taking effect,” and “[i]f the joint resolution is not passed by both houses of the General Assembly
within 180 days . . . the agency shall be prohibited from filing the proposed rule . . . and [it] shall
not take effect”).
105. H.R., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 166th Sess., at 34 (Ill. July 24, 2004).
106. Id. at 32.
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come in 1980, when the General Assembly had authorized the
legislative veto in the first place.
The measure was proposed and passed in haste, at a time when thenGovernor Rod Blagojevich’s relationship with the General Assembly
was already in steep decline.107 As one lawmaker remarked, this “was
one of those significant Bills that actually never went through the
legislative process, so we haven’t had a chance to debate it. I
understand it surfaced yesterday for the first time.”108 He also observed
that “[w]e are so caught up in the personalities of the Governor and the
Legislature that we’re not even seeing straight about the relationship
between these two branches.”109
This change was momentous. The twelve-member JCAR now had
legislative veto powers unprecedented in the state’s history. To the
degree administrative agencies could, during the last twenty-five years,
at least consider the prospect of standing up to JCAR and getting their
rules implemented, any realistic prospect of getting past JCAR had just
evaporated. Overnight, JCAR had become one of the most powerful
government entities in the state—virtually a branch unto itself.
Strangely, JCAR barely acknowledged this development in its 2004
Annual Report, failing to mention it altogether in the introductory or
overview materials, and burying the news in the middle of a paragraph
thirty-eight pages into the report.110
But this was in fact no small change. During the twenty-three years
that a JCAR veto would become permanent only if backed by a General
Assembly joint resolution (between 1981 and 2003), JCAR delayed or
suspended rules only thirty-nine times. During the ten years when a
JCAR veto became permanent unless it was overturned by a joint
resolution (between 2004 and 2013), the committee issued fifty-four
vetoes. In other words, since the JCAR veto went into effect in 2004,
the rate of JCAR suspensions and objections had more than tripled,
from 1.7 per year to 5.4 per year.111
The most recent chapter of JCAR story was written in 2009, when the
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id. (discussing the relationship between the Governor and the legislature).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32. The provision passed the House 110–4, and passed the Senate 49–5.
JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 41 (2005).
111. It is for this reason that JCAR’s powers prior to 2004 have occasionally been described
as anemic. See CHRISTOPHER Z. MOONEY & TIM STOREY, THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
1992–2003: LEADERSHIP CONTROL, CONTINUITY, AND PARTNERSHIP 39 (2005) (discussing the
belief that JCAR had little control over agencies).
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General Assembly passed House Bill 398, which states that “[a]ll
rulemaking authority exercised on or after [the law’s effective date] is
conditioned on the rules being adopted in accordance with all provisions
of this Act and all rules and procedures of the Joint Committee on
Administrative Rules (JCAR).”112 This language was presumably
intended to buttress the JCAR veto against judicial challenge. Indeed,
further language in House Bill 398 makes this conclusion seem
inevitable: “[A]ny purported rule not so adopted, for whatever reason,
including without limitation a decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction holding any part of this Act or the rules or procedures of
JCAR invalid, is unauthorized.”113
This remarkable provision suggests the General Assembly’s intent
that even if the courts decide that a JCAR veto violates separation-ofpowers principles, the vetoed rule still cannot take effect.114 As
discussed below, there is every reason to believe that this statute
represents legislative overreach, compounding rather than resolving the
serious constitutional issues that JCAR and General Assembly
legislative veto provisions raise.
II. LAWFULNESS OF LEGISLATIVE VETOES OVER AGENCY RULEMAKING
NATIONWIDE
With rare exceptions, legislative veto schemes have been ruled
unconstitutional in jurisdictions across the nation. To be sure, there is
something compelling about the logic of the legislative veto. The
authority to delegate rulemaking powers to an administrative body also
plausibly entails the authority to delegate a lesser power—the power to
promulgate rules subject to preapproval by the legislature. And
legislative review of proposed rules seems consonant with values of
democratic participation, because the final decision about whether rules
go into effect will be made by the elected representatives of the people
rather than by executive branch appointees. The availability of a
legislative veto also relieves the legislature of having to make the
112. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-6 (2016).
113. Id.
114. During floor debate, a state senator asked what would happen if “rules are promulgated
and a court finds . . . the Administrative Code or the Joint Committee invalid—help me
understand the logic how this statute could still have those rules continue to have the force of
law.” S., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. Assemb., 13th Sess., at 12 (Ill. Feb. 11, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Rutherford). The puzzling response was that if an agency chose to promulgate
rules, then it necessarily would be consenting to the JCAR scheme. Id. (statement of Sen.
Clayborne).
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difficult choice of deciding whether to delegate rulemaking authority to
an agency (and thus lose effective control over the process) or to reserve
rulemaking authority for itself and consequently have to draft detailed
rules by politicians with little or no expertise on the subject matter.
Yet, the chief problem, as identified by federal and state courts, is
that legislative vetoes allow legislatures to act outside of the constraints
of constitutionally mandated lawmaking procedures, wielding power
through an “extra-legislative control device.”115 Statutes that allow
agency rules to be nullified by passage of a joint resolution of both
houses of a legislature, for example, do not comply with constitutional
provisions for the presentment of bills to the executive for a potential
veto. Statutes that allow for rule nullification by the majority vote of a
single house of the legislature—so-called one-house vetoes—possess
not only a presentment but also a constitutional bicameralism problem.
And schemes that allow smaller legislative committees to act
unilaterally to kill agency rules arguably present not only bicameralism
and presentment problems, but also potentially raise a delegation issue.
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court held in INS v. Chadha that
legislative vetoes cannot be squared with the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of the United States Constitution.116 Several
states had previously come to the same conclusion under state
constitutional law, and following the release of Chadha many more
states likewise ruled legislative vetoes unconstitutional. As I discuss in
the next Part, the pertinent constitutional provisions in the Illinois
Constitution are fundamentally indistinguishable from those relied on in
these other federal and state cases, which suggests that legislative vetoes
are unlikely to survive future judicial scrutiny in Illinois.
This Part will first describe the Supreme Court’s discussion of
congressional vetoes in the Chadha case. Discussion will then shift to
an overview of the status of state schemes for legislative vetoes of
agency rulemaking in each state in which a judicial or attorney general
opinion has been issued. In only one state has such a legislative veto
scheme been deemed constitutional.

115. H. Lee Watson, Congress Steps Out; A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 990–91 (1975) (critiquing legislative vetoes as extra-legislative control
devices that unconstitutionally allow “the creation of power . . . to be wielded by the hand
creating it”).
116. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54 (1983).

15_FALKOFF FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1078

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/30/2016 12:48 PM

[Vol. 47

A. The Legislative Veto in the Federal System
The doctrine of separation of powers is, of course, fundamental to our
federal and state systems of government.
Baron Charles de
Montesquieu, whose The Spirit of Laws served as a primer for the
Framers of the federal Constitution, observed that the admixture of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers would tend toward
oppression and the loss of liberty.117 James Madison echoed these
cautions in Federalist No. 47, writing that the “accumulation of all
powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”118
But neither Montesquieu nor Madison believed that a perfect
separation of powers among the departments of government was
advisable or even possible. What chiefly needed to be guarded against,
according to Madison, was the undermining of freedom that would
occur when “the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department.”119
Montesquieu, according to Madison, “did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency or no control over the acts
of each other.”120 He illustrated the utility of imperfect separation with
examples from the several states.121 For instance, Massachusetts
authorized executive vetoes of legislative action as a “qualified
negative” on the body; provided for impeachment of members of the
executive and judicial branches by the senate; and allowed for
appointment of judges by the executive branch, with removal power in
the hands of the executive and legislative branches working in
tandem.122
Still, it was clear to Madison that the arrogation of power to the

117. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157
(Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books ed., 1992).
Likewise, George Washington warned in his Farewell Address that the “spirit of encroachment
tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the
form of government, a real despotism.” George Washington, Farewell Address, in 13 WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 306 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1892).
119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 118, at 245.
120. Id. at 248; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 118, at 253 (James Madison)
(stating it was unnecessary that “the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be
wholly unconnected with each other”).
121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 118, at 246–49 (James Madison).
122. Id. at 246–47.
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legislative branch was the chief evil to be avoided, as it “is every where
extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its
impetuous vortex.”123 The legislature was a body that deemed itself
most in touch with the will of the people, possessed the most influence
over them, and was “sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions
which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of
pursuing the objects of its passions.”124 Its constitutional powers were
“at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits” than
those of the other branches, and it could “with the greater facility, mask
under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it
makes on the co-ordinate departments.”125 These sentiments have
echoed through American jurisprudence.126
The insight was that although there was wisdom in granting the
executive conditional veto power over the legislature, the obverse was
not true. As Montesquieu explained, the legislature should have the
right and the power “to examine the manner in which the laws it has
made have been executed” so as to hold the executive accountable.127
But it should not have the “reciprocal faculty of checking the executive
power,”128 because there would then be no limit to the powers the
legislature could arrogate to itself.
It is against this historical background that the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed for the first time the constitutionality of legislative vetoes in
Chadha.129 At issue in the case was a federal statute that authorized the
Attorney General of the United States to suspend an alien’s deportation
order, subject to disapproval of the Attorney General’s action by either
123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 118, at 251 (James Madison).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976) (“[T]he debates of the Constitutional
Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative
Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two
branches.”); Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Ky. 1984) (noting
that a “motivating factor” that led to the Kentucky Constitution was “a strong desire on the part of
the people to curb the power of the General Assembly”). See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES
ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 214 (1784) (“[T]he powers of government should be so divided and
balanced among several bodies . . . that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being
effectually checked and restrained by the others.”).
127. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 117, at 162 (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. Prior to its decision in Chadha, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo decided it was
unnecessary to pass on the validity of legislative veto. 424 U.S. at 140 n.176 (1976). In
concurrence, Justice White stated that he thought the legislative veto was not unconstitutional.
Id. at 284–85 (White, J., concurring).
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the Senate or House of Representatives by means of a resolution.130 In
short, the question was whether a “one-House veto” over executive
action was constitutional.131
The Court acknowledged that legislative vetoes had proliferated in
the states since the 1930s, in part because such schemes seemed to offer
a convenient and efficient way to police executive compliance with
legislation.132 It likewise nodded toward the robust scholarly debate
about the policy benefits of legislative vetoes. 133 But the wisdom of the
legislation, according to the Court, had no bearing on the constitutional
questions before it.134 Instead, the problem with the legislative veto
was that it was incompatible with separation-of-powers principles in the
broad sense, and that it violated the Constitution’s presentment and
bicameralism requirements in particular.135
With respect to presentment, the Constitution requires that “[e]very
bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of
the United States” for a potential veto.136 The presentment requirement
was “so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains” to assure it
could not be avoided, for example by calling a proposed law a
“resolution” or a “vote” rather than a “bill.”137 The need to give the
President a qualified power to nullify legislation through a veto “was
based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers
conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully
circumscribed.”138 The executive veto was an effort to “check whatever

130. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926–27 (1983) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2) (2012)).
131. Id. at 927 n.2 (noting that the Court would refer to the “resolution” power as a “oneHouse veto” of the Attorney General’s decision).
132. Legislative veto provisions were included in federal legislation at least eighty-three times
in 126 different acts of Congress between 1933 and 1976. See H.R. Rep. No. 1014, at 14 (1976).
133. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945.
134. Id.
135. Unlike in the constitutions of most states (including Illinois), there is no specific
“separation of powers” provision in the federal Constitution. The Court in Chadha noted, though,
that the principle of “was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was
woven into the document that they drafted.” 462 U.S. at 946 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 124 (1976)).
136. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2; see also id. art I, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every Order, Resolution, or
Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary . . .
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the
Senate and House of Representatives.”).
137. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947.
138. Id.
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propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive,
improvident, or ill-considered measures.”139
As for bicameralism, the Court noted that the Constitution required
presentment of a bill to the President only after it “shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate.”140 The Court then quoted
widely from the Framers about the wisdom of dividing the legislature
into two houses and requiring bicameral agreement before presentation
of a bill to the President.141
The Court did not hold in Chadha that the legislative veto exercised
by Congress was constitutionally invalid because Congress had
exercised executive powers. After acknowledging that the functions of
government were not “hermetically sealed” from one another, the Court
observed that the powers of the three branches were nonetheless
“functionally identifiable” and that Congress had here in fact exercised
legislative powers.142 First, the Court presumed that when a branch of
government acts it is “exercising the power the Constitution has
delegated to it.”143 And here the Constitution had delegated to
Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”144
According to the Court, Congress was attempting to exercise that power
when it tried—through the use of the legislative veto—to overrule the
Attorney General’s exercise of his statutory authority to suspend
Chadha’s deportation.145
The problem with Congress’s veto was instead simply that it
represented an attempt to exercise the body’s legitimate legislative
power in a manner that failed to comply with the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.146
139. Id. at 947–48.
140. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7 (emphasis added).
141. The Court quotes Madison, for example, expressing his view that, because the legislature
dominates in a republican government, it is necessary “‘to divide the legislature into different
branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as
little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common
dependence on the society will admit.’” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
51, at 324 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
142. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)).
143. Id. at 951.
144. Id. at 952 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
145. Id. at 952 (“Examination of the action taken here by one House . . . reveals that it was
essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”).
146. Id. at 953–54; see also Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 (1991) (“If the power is executive, the Constitution does
not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise
it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7. In short,
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Justice White dissented, offering a functionalist defense of the
legislative veto against what he took to be the majority’s formalist
approach.
He noted (correctly) that Chadha’s holding would
immediately invalidate nearly two hundred other “legislative veto”
provisions, which had been Congress’s attempt to assure that the
executive and its independent agencies acted with some
accountability.147 Without the legislative veto, he observed, Congress
was now left with an unappealing choice—“either to refrain from
delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with the hopeless task
of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special
circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to
abdicate its law-making function to the Executive Branch and
independent agencies.”148
Justice White’s dissent was an impassioned plea to acknowledge that
we are living in a new age, in which we have willingly made
concessions to the purer vision of the separation-of-powers doctrine that
was envisioned by the Framers.149 After all, legislative authority is
already
routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent
regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups. “The rise
of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal
trend of the last century. . . . They have become a veritable fourth

when Congress ‘[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch,’ it must take that action by the
procedures authorized in the Constitution.” (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952–55) (alterations in
original)); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425,
476 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The fundamental problem of the one-house veto, then, is that it represents
an attempt by Congress to retain direct control over delegated administrative power. Congress
may provide detailed rules of conduct to be administered without discretion by administrative
officers, or it may provide broad policy guidance and leave the details to be filled in by
administrative officers exercising substantial discretion. It may not, however, insert one of its
houses as an effective administrative decisionmaker.”).
147. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. See Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power
Over the Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the
Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 28–29 (1984) (agreeing with the conclusion in
Chadha, but suggesting the majority failed to recognize that not every “legislative” act is a lawmaking act); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1994)
(observing that while the majority accurately described the roles of each department and the
importance of the separation of powers, it did not state why this particular veto violated those
roles or separation-of-powers principles).
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branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal
theories.”150

In short, Justice White suggested that the history of the separation-ofpowers doctrine in the United States had been one of “accommodation
and practicality,” and that the Chadha disapproval of the legislative veto
was unfaithful to this approach.151
B. The Legislative Veto in the States
Like Congress, state legislatures have sought to gain control over
administrative agencies by passing statutes that authorize legislative
vetoes to permanently block implementation of proposed rules.152 In
some states, the legislature must pass a joint resolution of both houses to
kill agency rules, while in others a majority vote of just one house will
be adequate. In yet other states, a joint legislative committee can by
majority vote singlehandedly keep regulations from being enforced.
What these legislative veto schemes have in common is that, with a
single exception, they have been deemed unlawful when their
constitutionality has been challenged. In at least twelve states, the
150. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 984 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S.
470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
151. Id. at 999. A number of scholars agree with Justice White that the majority’s approach in
Chadha simply ignored the evolution of lawmaking traditions, and that in fact the best way to
protect separation-of-powers principles is to allow some legislative oversight of delegations to the
other branches. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 149, at 27; Misty Ventura, The Legislative Veto:
A Move Away From Separation of Powers or a Tool to Ensure Nondelegation?, 49 SMU L. REV.
401, 431 (1996); William J. Wagner, Balancing as Art: Justice White and the Separation of
Powers, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 957, 963 (2003). For a collection of articles critiquing the
majority’s reasoning in Chadha, see Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative
Committee Suspension of Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237,
1250 n.63 (1986).
152. As of 1982, the year before Chadha was decided, eleven states had no system of
legislative supervision, fifteen had advisory committees to review executive rulemaking and
make recommendations to the full legislature to modify the rules by statute, one had a one-House
veto, eleven had a two-House veto, and nine authorized a legislative committee to suspend the
rule for a limited period of time pending final legislative action. Levinson, supra note 35, at 81–
83; see also Neslin, supra note 75, at 674 nn. 28–29 (counting eighteen states that had authorized
a legislative veto by one or both houses, but including in his list states where the authorization
had already been deemed unconstitutional by the time of the Chadha decision); David Pascal
Zambito, Comment, An “Irrc-some” Issue: Does Pennsylvania’s Regulatory Review Act Violate
Separation of Powers?, 101 DICK. L. REV. 643, 643 n.4 (counting, as of 1982, forty-two states
had some provision for legislative review of state regulations (citing Iver Peterson, Court’s
Outlawing of Congress’s Veto Casts Shadows on State Legislatures, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1983,
at A8)). Each year, the Council of State Governments includes in its Book of the States tables
identifying the powers and procedures of legislatures for reviewing executive agency rulemaking.
See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVT’S, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2014, at 118–24 (2014),
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-type/book-states.
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legislative veto has been deemed unconstitutional either by court
decision or in an attorney general opinion. Five of these states had by
statute authorized joint-resolution vetoes: Alaska,153 West Virginia,154
New Jersey,155 Kansas,156 and Missouri.157 Two of the states in which
the legislative veto was deemed unlawful had authorized one-house
vetoes by statute: Oklahoma158 and Pennsylvania.159 A one-house veto
was also ruled unlawful in a third state, Massachusetts, though in the
context of pending rather than enacted legislation.160 And five states
had authorized legislative committee vetoes: New Hampshire,161
Kentucky,162 Oregon,163 Michigan,164 and West Virginia (which also
allowed a veto of agency rulemaking by joint resolution).165 The only
legislative veto scheme that has affirmatively withstood judicial or
attorney general scrutiny is Idaho’s, which authorizes a joint resolution
veto of agency rulemaking.166 Moreover, no scheme authorizing a
committee to exercise veto powers over agency rulemaking has ever

153. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320(a), repealed by 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 164, § 7.
154. W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-12(b) (2016). This statutory provision authorized the legislature
to exercise a kind of “pocket veto” if it failed to authorize agency rules by joint resolution. W.
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Hechler, 376 S.E.2d 839, 841 (W. Va. 1988).
155. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-4.4 (West 1981) (repealed 2001).
156. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-426 (West 2015); see also State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of
Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (1984) (finding previous version of statute unconstitutional
without presentment to the governor).
157. There was no single statute in Missouri that authorized these procedures. Constitutional
amendments that would have established such procedures were twice defeated. Nonetheless,
these requirements were included individually in a series of statutes. See Mo. Coal. for the Env’t
v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); see also Dean,
supra note 33, at 1223–24 n.5 (listing statutes where these review provisions had been inserted).
158. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308 (repealed 1995).
159. 71 PA. CONS. ST. § 745.7 (2016); see also Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741,
749 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1989), vacated on grounds of mootness 614 A.2d 204, 211 (Pa. 1992)
(holding the constitutionality issue moot in light of the legislature’s subsequent statutory
elimination of the one-House veto).
160. S., 1763, § 29, 1986 Leg. (Mass. 1986); Op. of the Justices, 493 N.E.2d 859 (Mass. 1986)
(rendering an advisory opinion, at the request of the Senate, concerning the legislative
certification provisions of section 29 of 1986 Senate Bill 1763).
161. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:2 (2016); see also Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788
(N.H. 1981) (finding previous version of statute unconstitutional).
162. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.087 (repealed 1984).
163. OR. REV. STAT. § 459-298 (repealed 1995).
164. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.245 to 24.246 (2016); see also Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611
N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 2000) (finding provisions of previous version of the statute to be
unconstitutional for lack of compliance with the enactment and presentment requirements of the
Michigan Constitution).
165. W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-11.
166. IDAHO CODE § 67-5291 (2015); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.245 to 24.246.
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been upheld as constitutional in any jurisdiction, federal or state.
In each of the states in which the legislative veto has been deemed
unconstitutional, “separation of powers” problems, broadly speaking,
are implicated. Although the constitutional analysis tends to be
consistent from state to state, there is some nonuniformity in reasoning
that bears remark.
The chief problem that the courts (and attorneys general) perceive
with legislative veto schemes is that the legislature has authorized itself
to take action in a manner that need not comply with constitutional
requirements for enacting laws. Legislatures may only act pursuant to
their legislative powers,167 which they must exercise in accord with
constitutional provisions that require passage by a majority of both
houses of the legislature and presentment of the bill to the governor for
approval or executive veto.168
In the states that authorize either a single house of the legislature or a
legislative committee to kill agency rules, bicameralism failures have
been fatal to the legislative veto scheme.169 The courts have observed
that action by a single house undermines much of the point of the
bicameral system, which was designed to ascertain the legislative will
167. “A resolution is essentially legislative where it affects the legal rights, duties and
regulations of persons outside the legislative branch and therefore must comply with the
enactment provisions of the constitution.”
State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of
Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 638 (Kan. 1984).
168. See, e.g., Gen. Assembly of State of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982) (“A
veto which effectively amends or repeals existing law offends the Constitution because it is
tantamount to passage of a new law without the approval of the Governor.”).
169. See Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1981) (noting that the “wholesale
shifting” of legislative authority to small committees violates constitutional provisions requiring
the House and Senate to act pursuant to a quorum of both bodies, and that the system failed to
comply with bicameralism requirements); Gilliam Cty. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or.,
849 P.2d 500, 502, 505 (Or. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality
of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (finding scheme that required a joint legislative committee to
approve agency rules before they became effective was unconstitutional because the veto “was a
legislative act, and a legislative act by less than a majority of each chamber is unconstitutional”);
State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 632 (W. Va. 1981); Letter from Michael C.
Turpen, Attorney Gen. of Okla., to Marvin York, State Sen., Okl. A.G. Opin. No. 86-17, 1986
WL 235082, at *1–2 (Feb. 24, 1986) (explaining his “relatively simple analysis” was that because
the only power possessed by the Oklahoma legislature was the legislative power, “which may
only be exercised bicamerally and with presentment,” Oklahoma’s constitutional system did not
allow a resolution adopted by a single house “to have the force and effect of law beyond the
bounds of that house”); cf. Martinez v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d
582, 586 (Wis. 1992) (finding no constitutional problem with a legislative review scheme in
which a joint committee was authorized only to recommend that the legislature pass legislation
through the usual enactment process in order to prevent agency rules from being implemented).
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by empowering each house with a negative upon the other.170 And
action by a legislative committee is even more problematic, as it places
governmental decisions in the hands of such a small portion of the
legislative body.171
Statutes that allow a legislative veto only by a joint resolution do not
face a bicameralism problem, but typically fail because of a failure to
comply with presentment requirements. State constitutions require all
bills to be presented to the governor before becoming enforceable as
law in order to provide the governor an executive veto that might act as
a counterweight to the powers of the legislature.172 Because legislative
veto schemes of all stripes—legislative committee, one-house, or joint
resolution—are designed precisely to freeze the governor out of the
process, they have been found not to withstand constitutional scrutiny in
many states.173

170. Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d at 788.
171. See, e.g., Barker, 279 S.E.2d at 635 (noting that veto power in the hands of a legislative
committee “plac[es] the final control over governmental actions in the hands of only a few
individuals who are answerable only to local electorates”).
172. See, e.g., State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980) (explaining
that the presentment requirement is meant “to preserve the integrity of . . . [the executive] branch
of government . . . and thus maintain an equilibrium of governmental powers . . . [and] to act as a
check upon corrupt or hasty and ill-considered legislation” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted; other modifications in original)).
173. See Stephan, 687 P. 2d at 638 (agreeing with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
conclusion that “[f]oreclosing the Governor from the law-making process offends the separation
of powers and the Presentment Clause” and is an “exercise of legislative power that the
Constitution forbids” (quoting Byrne, 448 A.2d at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted))); Op.
of the Justices to the Senate, 493 N.E.2d 859, 863–64 (Mass. 1986) (observing that the
“consensus of both Houses of the Legislature as ‘an open-ended means of regulating the conduct
of members of the executive branch’ would violate the constitutional provision concerning the
executive veto” (quoting Op. of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1223 (Mass. 1978))); Mo. Coal.
for the Env’t v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 134 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (“The
legislature may not unilaterally control execution of rulemaking authority after its delegation of
rulemaking power,” but it “may, of course, attempt to control the executive branch by passing
amendatory or supplemental legislation and presenting such legislation to the governor for
signature or veto, or by the power of appropriation.”); Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530,
536 (Mich. 2000) (holding the veto power of JCAR and the legislature to be “inherently
legislative” and therefore “subject to the enactment and presentment requirements of the
Michigan Constitution”); Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d at 788 (holding proposed statute would
violate New Hampshire Constitution part II, article 45, requiring presentment to executive for
potential veto, because there was “no provision in the proposed bill for laying the rule before the
chief executive for his approval”); Gilliam, 849 P.2d at 505–06 (noting that a veto is a legislative
act, and as such must comply with constitutional enactment requirements including presentation
to the Governor for signing or for return to the legislature with written objections);
Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741, 749 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (noting that “[n]othing
less than legislation may suffice to override the rule-making power of . . . [any] executive
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Occasionally, plaintiffs have challenged legislative review schemes
as unconstitutional “legislative vetoes” even where by statute the “veto”
requires passage by majorities of both houses of the legislature and
presentment to the governor for a potential executive veto.
Unsurprisingly, the courts have rightly concluded that such schemes are
not unconstitutional, because the legislatures are authorized to do no
more than act in conformance with pre-existing constitutional
enactment requirements.174
In addition, courts across the nation have rejected arguments that
legislative veto schemes do in fact comport with bicameralism and
presentment requirements because the statutes that created the
legislative vetoes were themselves passed by both houses of the
legislature and presented to the governor for a veto. Such an argument,
if accepted, would allow a legislature by a single piece of legislation to
relieve itself of the burden of complying with constitutional enactment
rules.175 As the Alaska Supreme Court observed, such a law “would
impermissibly preserve legislative power possessed at one instant in
time for future periods when the legislature might otherwise be
incapable of acting because of the executive veto.”176 And as the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated, “the Legislature cannot circumvent the
constitutional requirement of presentment to the Governor merely by
passing a statute which allows such a procedure.”177
agency,” and observing “serious questions of constitutionality” under state constitutional
provisions requiring, among other things, “gubernatorial presentment”), vacated on grounds of
mootness 614 A.2d 204, 211 (Pa. 1992) (holding the issue moot in light of the legislature’s
subsequent statutory elimination of the one-House veto); Barker, 279 S.E.2d at 632 (noting that
the legislature could give “the binding effect of law” to its actions “only by following the formal
enactment process”); Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 583 (upholding a legislative review scheme in
which legislative action to kill an agency rule required presentment to the executive before taking
effect, thus proving the statute was “carefully drawn to avoid a separation of powers challenge
and meets presentment and bicameral requirements”); cf. Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State
of Cal., 20 P.3d 533, 542 (Cal. 2001) (noting that the legislative review scheme at issue was
constitutional but that it “would be unconstitutional if it permitted a single house of the
Legislature to suspend a departmental mandate without . . . presentment to the Governor”).
174. See, e.g., Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 587 (“The full involvement of both houses of the
legislature and the governor are critical elements of [the legislative review provisions at issue]
and these elements distinguish Wisconsin from the statutory schemes found to violate separation
of powers doctrines in other states.”); Carmel Valley, 20 P.3d at 542 (holding that a legislative
review scheme was constitutional because it required bicameralism and presentment).
175. See, e.g., A.L.I.V.E., 606 P.2d at 779 (“In other words, by virtue of one enactment
approved by the governor, the legislature can free itself, in certain instances, of the constitutional
constraints that would otherwise govern its actions.”).
176. Id.
177. Byrne, 448 A.2d at 446; see also Stephan, 687 P.2d at 638 (“The legislature cannot pass
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Thus far, this Section has discussed bicameralism and presentment
problems as implicating the separation-of-powers doctrine broadly.
And to be sure, the presentment requirement in particular is integral to
state constitutional schemes as a way of assuring proper checks and
balances between the political branches. When a statute authorizes
legislative action without allowing the governor a chance to veto the
action, it is fair to say that separation-of-powers principles have been
undermined.
But there is another way in which separation-of-powers concerns
might lead a court to view legislative veto schemes with suspicion.
Where one branch of government exercises authority over a function
belonging to another branch—including authority explicitly delegated
by the constitution—there may be a stand-alone separation-of-powers
violation. With respect to legislative vetoes, the argument would be that
legislative interference with agency rulemaking intrudes on the powers
of the executive branch and therefore violates state constitutional
separation-of-powers principles, whether they are explicitly written into
the state constitution or not.
This stand-alone separation-of-powers argument is a difficult one.
First, it is far from clear that legislative interference with agency
rulemaking can be characterized as interference with executive powers,
as the power to promulgate rules that will have the force of law belongs
initially with the legislature and can only be exercised by an
administrative agency if the power is delegated to them. As such, the
rulemaking power is probably best characterized as legislative or quasilegislative in nature.178 Second, even if the agency’s rulemaking power
is assumed to be executive in nature,179 separation-of-powers provisions
do not and could not require absolute segregation of functions between
the branches.180 Only where one branch seeks to exercise power over a
an act that allows it to violate the constitution.” (citing Byrne, 448 A.2d at 438)).
178. “It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the
operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 118, at 255 (James Madison).
179. See, e.g., Stephan, 687 P.2d at 635; see also Byrne, 448 A.2d at 443 (demurring over the
question of whether agency rules are legislative or executive in nature, noting that in “their effects
on private conduct, the types of commands embodied in executive rules may not differ greatly
from those in many statutes”).
180. See, e.g., Byrne, 448 A.2d at 439 (“[L]egislative cooperation with the Executive does not
always unduly intrude upon the Executive’s power to enforce the law. In many situations
‘responsibility is joint and governmental powers must be shared and exercised by the branches on
a complementary basis if the ultimate governmental objective is to be achieved.’” (quoting
Knight v. Margate, 431 A.2d 833, 840–41 (N.J. 1981))).
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core function of another branch, or over a function that has been
explicitly delegated to another branch by the state constitution, will
there be a significant separation-of-powers issue. Legislative vetoes of
agency rulemaking, therefore, are not likely candidates for stand-alone
separation-of-powers violations.181
But occasionally courts have found that the adoption of regulations is
an executive function,182 and they have sometimes concluded that
legislative review of regulations would constitute “a legislative
encroachment into the power of the executive branch.”183 In the end,
these courts have concluded that the legislative veto is unconstitutional,
though for reasons that are not as compelling as in those cases in which
bicameralism and presentment were identified as the chief constitutional
problems.
As mentioned earlier, in just a single state has a high court embraced
the constitutionality of legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking. In
Mead v. Arnell, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a statutory scheme
whereby agency rules—whether already in effect or just proposed—
could be nullified by means of a concurrent resolution adopted by both
the House and Senate of the Idaho Legislature.184 The court, divided
three to two, premised its conclusion that the legislative veto entailed no
181. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1981) (noting, on the way toward
holding the particular legislative veto scheme at issue in the case to be unconstitutional, that
because the rulemaking authority of agencies “derives solely from that power which the
legislature delegates to them, . . . the creation of a legislative veto is not per se unconstitutional”);
Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State of Cal., 20 P.3d 533, 541 (Cal. 2001) (“[W]e believe that a
legislative enactment that limits the mandate of an administrative agency or withdraws certain of
its powers is not necessarily suspect under the doctrine of separation of powers.”).
182. See, e.g., Stephan, 687 P.2d at 635 (“[T]he power to adopt rules and regulations is
essentially executive or administrative in nature, not legislative.”); Commonwealth v. Jubelirer,
567 A.2d 741, 749 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), vacated on grounds of mootness 614 A.2d 204 (Pa.
1992) (holding the legislative veto interfered with the executive’s responsibility to administer the
law, and stating that “[n]othing less than legislation may suffice to override the rule-making
power of . . . [any] executive agency”).
183. Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984); Mo. Coal. for
the Env’t v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 133 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (finding
that the legislative veto scheme “goes well beyond any incidental overlap of powers” and
“violates constitutional principles concerning the separation of executive and legislative
functions” by allowing the legislature to unconstitutionally interfere with executive action). The
Kentucky Supreme Court also concluded that the legislature encroached on judicial functions by
exercising a legislative veto, since the legislative review of the rules was to determine whether
they comported with statutory authority and carried out legislative intent. “It requires no citation
of authority to state unequivocally that such a determination is a judicial matter and is within the
purview of the judiciary . . . .” Legislative Research Comm’n, 664 S.W.2d at 919.
184. Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410, 412 (Idaho 1990) (discussing IDAHO CODE § 67-5218).
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separation-of-powers problem on the fact that an administrative
agency’s power to issue rules and regulations was a delegation of power
to the executive rather than an inherent constitutional power.185 Thus,
for example, there might be a separation-of-powers issue if the
legislature by concurrent resolution had instead attempted “to prevent
the Attorney General from taking legal action for some violation of a
statute,” because “enforcing the law of this state is a constitutionally
mandated executive department function resting in the office of the
Attorney General.”186 In contrast, the legislative veto of agency rules is
an exercise of power over “a legislative delegation of power [that] is
neither the legal nor functional equivalent of constitutional power.”187
Thus far the court’s opinion is unobjectionable (though as discussed
above, not all state high courts would agree with either its premises or
conclusions). More problematic is that the majority in Mead never
forthrightly explained why it believed the legislature could kill agency
rules through a joint resolution rather than through the ordinary
lawmaking enactment process. As Justice Bistline explained in dissent,
the issue was “whether the Idaho Legislature may, by resolution,
rescind the rules promulgated by an executive department or
agency . . . . If the issue were whether the legislature could do so by
enactment, there would be no need to take pen in hand.”188
The conclusion to be reached from this survey of federal and state
law is that the chief objection of the courts and attorneys general to the
legislative veto is that it allows the legislature to exercise power over
the executive branch without complying with constitutional restrictions
on the manner in which it may act. While stand-alone separation-ofpowers violations are sometimes discerned by jurists, far more
185. Id. at 415 (“[W]e have consistently found the origin of this rule making capacity in a
delegation from the legislature not a constitutional grant of power to the executive and have
consistently held such rules or regulations promulgated hereunder to be less than the equivalent of
statutory law.”).
186. Id. at 417.
187. Id. Of course, in such a situation the legislature would presumably be acting in violation
of separation-of-powers principles even if it were to pass a statute, consistent with constitutional
bicameralism and presentment requirements, that purported to prevent the Attorney General from
taking legal action for the violation of a statute.
188. Id. at 427 (Bistline, J., dissenting); see also id. at 428 (reciting history of joint and
concurrent resolution in the state and noting earlier court holding that “the force and effect of
joint resolutions or concurrent resolutions is just that much, advisory or recommendatory, but
nothing more”); id. at 422–23 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
if the legislature believes an agency is misusing authority, it should act by amending the statute to
redefine the agency’s authority or else rescind it altogether by following the procedures for
legislation set forth in the state constitution).
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problematic is the legislature’s attempt to short-circuit executive
oversight of its powers to kill agency rulemaking.189
III. JCAR AND THE LEGISLATIVE VETO IN ILLINOIS
The lawfulness of legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking has not yet
been addressed in Illinois.190 But when a proper case is ready for
adjudication by the courts, there is every reason to believe that such
vetoes will be deemed unlawful under the Illinois Constitution, just as
they have been in the federal and most other state systems.
To be sure, decisions from federal and state courts concerning the
constitutionality of legislative vetoes in their own jurisdictions are in no
way binding on the Illinois courts, which alone are responsible for
interpreting the requirements of the Illinois Constitution.191 But
decisions from other jurisdictions have persuasive value, and are
unlikely to be discounted altogether by the Illinois courts when a case
properly raising the legislative veto question is before them.192

189. Most academic commentators likewise believe legislative vetoes, unless specifically
authorized by a state’s constitution, are unlawful. See, e.g., ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 498 (1986) (“In the absence of a constitutional provision
expressly authorizing such action, nonstatutory legislative vetoes or suspensions of particular
agency rules are probably impermissible under most state constitutions.”); Dean, supra note 33, at
1157 (calling the legislative veto a “constitutional virus”).
190. In cases where JCAR review of agency rulemaking was challenged, the legislative veto
was never properly before the court. See, e.g., Quinn v. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ill.
1985) (noting that the issue of an “illegal legislative veto of an executive action . . . is not before
us”); Reece v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 767 N.E.2d 395, 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that
“the issue of whether [a contested] action would constitute a legislative veto is not before us”).
191. “[W]here Federal questions are not involved, as where State constitutions and statutes are
to be construed, State courts are not required to follow Federal court decisions although they may
be persuasive.” Ray Sch.-Chi., Inc. v. Cummins, 146 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ill. 1957) (citations
omitted); see also Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 613 (1937) (“[A]
judgment by the highest court of a state as to the meaning and effect of its own constitution is
decisive and controlling everywhere.”); Relsolelo v. Fisk, 760 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Ill. 2001) (“[W]e
are not bound to interpret our own constitutional provisions lockstep with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the federal constitution.”). Jim Rossi has noted generally that “[a]lthough many
describe state courts as adopting a deferential position towards, and rarely deviating from, federal
constitutional doctrine, in the separation of powers context the approach of many state courts,
echoing Antifederalist ideals, contrasts starkly with the approach of federal courts.” Rossi, supra
note 34, at 1189 (footnote omitted).
192. In addition, a court analyzing the lawfulness of JCAR and General Assembly provisions
for review of agency rulemaking will begin with the proposition that the General Assembly’s
statutes are presumed to be constitutional. People v. La Pointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352 (Ill. 1981).
The burden would be on the party challenging the validity of the statute to “demonstrate clearly a
constitutional violation.” People v. Wilson, 827 N.E.2d 416, 419–20 (Ill. 2005); see also
Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce v. Pappas, 880 N.E.2d 1105, 1117 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
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This Part will analyze the constitutionality of JCAR and General
Assembly scheme for reviewing agency rulemaking. It will focus
primarily on the text of the Illinois Constitution and its separation-ofpowers, bicameralism, and presentment requirements.193 In doing so, it
will take account of the unique history of the Illinois Constitution,
judicial precedent that might bear on the legitimacy of legislative vetoes
in the state, and persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions. The first
Section will assess whether legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking
represent a stand-alone violation of the separation-of-powers clause. It
will focus primarily on whether such a scheme encroaches on the
executive branch’s powers, with a conclusion that it does not. The
Section will also entertain the argument that JCAR and General
Assembly vetoes encroach on judicial powers, and will conclude that
there is some merit to this contention. The second Section will address
the enactment provisions of the Illinois Constitution—including most
particularly the bicameralism and presentment requirements—and will
conclude, in accord with almost all other jurisdictions, that the
legislative veto is incompatible with such provisions. This Section will
also assess and reject the argument that because the legislation that
created JCAR and General Assembly veto provisions were themselves
passed in accord with constitutional enactment requirements, legislative
vetoes are constitutional. A final Section will assess the importance of
House Bill 398, which by its terms would seem to require the cessation
of all future rulemaking by agencies if the courts invalidate the state’s
legislative veto review schemes.
A. Separation-of-Powers Issues
The Illinois Constitution is not a minor league version of the U.S.
Constitution. Although it is similar in structure to the federal
Constitution and to many state constitutions, it has its own history and
its own operative language. To take an example, the U.S. Constitution
has no “separation-of-powers” clause, while the first section of Article
II of the Illinois Constitution states: “The legislative, executive and
judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers
properly belonging to another.”194
(“Moreover, courts will construe statutes, if possible, to be constitutional.”).
193. In doing so, it is worth noting preliminarily that in Illinois the courts must construe a
statute so as to “affirm the statute’s constitutionality and validity, if reasonably possible.” People
v. Hammond, 2011 IL 110044, ¶ 55.
194. ILL. CONST. art. II § 1. The modern language was first adopted in 1941, but reflects in
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There have been four constitutions since Illinois became a state in
1818, and the trend over time in the documents has been to weaken the
powers of the legislative branch. Broadly speaking, the original 1818
constitution was drafted and adopted in a time of distrust of the
executive branch and popular apprehension about powers wielded by
colonial and, later, territorial governors. The document was designed to
reflect that the legislature, as the true and most direct embodiment of the
popular will, was the chief repository of government power.195 The
Governor was thus granted limited powers by this first constitution.
Rather than possessing a veto over bills passed by the legislature, for
example, the constitution provided that the Governor and the members
of the Illinois Supreme Court would sit as a “council of revision,”
indicating whether or not they approved or disapproved of legislation
that was about to take effect as law. Any disapproved legislation would
be returned to the General Assembly, which could then pass it into law
by a simple majority vote.196
At the time of the formation of the second Illinois Constitution of
1848, however, legislative excesses in the state and a new Jacksonian
faith in strong executive leadership led to a modified constitutional
scheme. Legislative powers were somewhat restricted in the new
constitution, and the “council of revision” scheme was replaced with a
straight-up gubernatorial veto, though this veto could still be overridden
by a simple majority vote of the General Assembly. 197 In the third
Illinois Constitution of 1870, however, this gubernatorial veto was
substance the original provision from the original constitution in 1818. See ILL. CONST. of 1818,
art. I (“The powers of the government of the State of Illinois, shall be divided into three distinct
departments, and each of them be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which
are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judiciary, to
another. No person, or collection of persons, being one of those departments, shall exercise any
power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or
permitted.”).
195. See JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818–1970, at 12 (1972).
In the federal system, the government is limited in its powers to only those granted by the
Constitution. See Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited Government Theory of
Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 642–45 (2007) (discussing limited
government and collecting major scholarship on the doctrine). In Illinois, by contrast, the
legislature is presumed to already possess all governmental powers, and the state constitution
works to limit its powers. See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its Nature and
Purpose, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3, at 13 (
Victoria Ranney ed., 1970).
196. WALTER F. DODD & DUE HUTCHISON DODD, GOVERNMENT IN ILLINOIS 56–57 (1923);
Kauper, supra note 195 at 13; ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION 4 (2011).
197. CORNELIUS, supra note 195, at 35; DODD & DODD, supra note 196, at 56; LOUSIN, supra
note 196, at 9.
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strengthened by requiring a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for
an override.198
The gubernatorial veto requirement remains the constitutional
scheme today, under the fourth and current Illinois Constitution of
1970, though now the General Assembly may override the veto by vote
of three-fifths of each house.199 In addition, the current constitution
gives the governor a variety of types of vetoes to exercise, including a
veto over an entire bill, a line-item veto, the ability to reduce the amount
of an item, and the ability to propose revisions to bills already passed
that the legislature can accept or reject.200 In sum, one central dynamic
of the Illinois Constitution since 1819 has been its transformation from
a document recognizing the primacy of the legislative branch to one that
has increasingly sought to restrain the General Assembly by
strengthening the veto power of the Governor.201
The separation-of-powers provision of the Illinois Constitution—both
in its original form and in its current incarnation—has never been
understood to require absolute segregation of powers among the three
branches of government. In 1839, Chief Justice Wilson explained that
while the separation-of-powers language was “a declaration of a
fundamental principle,” it was nonetheless “to be understood in a
limited and qualified sense.”202 It fundamentally meant that all of one
branch’s powers cannot be subsumed by another branch. The provision
does not mean that the legislative, executive, and judicial power
should be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no
connection or dependence, the one upon the other; but its true
meaning, both in theory and practice, is, that the whole power of two
or more of these departments shall not be lodged in the same hands,
whether of one or many.203

These sentiments have been confirmed repeatedly in Illinois case law
up to the present era.204
198.
199.
200.
201.

ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 5, § 16; see also LOUSIN, supra note 196, at 13.
ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 9.
LOUSIN, supra note 196, at 33.
See, e.g., FRANK KOPECKY & MARY SHERMAN HARRIS, UNDERSTANDING THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION 2 (2000).
202. Field v. People, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79, 83–84 (1839) (Wilson, C.J.) (construing same
provision but with earlier constitutional language).
203. Id.
204. See Pucinski v. Cty. of Cook, 737 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. 2000) (separation-of-powers
clause “does not create rigid boundaries prohibiting every exercise of functions by one branch of
government which ordinarily are exercised by another”); Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047,
1051 (Ill. 1997) (purpose is not to “achieve a complete divorce between the branches of
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As far back as 1910, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that
administrative officers “are frequently charged with duties that partake
of the character of all three of the departments, but which cannot be
classed as belonging essentially to either.”205
For example,
administrative officers “are frequently called upon, in the performance
of their duties, to exercise judgment and discretion, to investigate,
deliberate, and decide, and yet it has been held that they do not exercise
judicial power, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.”206
Nonetheless, each branch of government holds powers that substantially
belong to that branch and that cannot be exercised by a coordinate
branch without implicating the separation-of-powers provision of the
Illinois Constitution. Even though complete separation is neither
expected nor desired, “[e]ach branch of government has its own unique
sphere of authority that cannot be exercised by another branch.”207
While the Illinois Constitution itself does not define the powers of the
three branches,208 the Illinois Supreme Court has broadly defined the
government”); Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 92 N.E. 814, 833 (Ill. 1910) (branches cannot “be
kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or interdependence.”); Field, 3 Ill.
(2 Scam.) at 84 (provisions on separation of powers should only be read as a “broad theoretical
line of demarcation, between the great departments of government”); see also DAVID R. MILLER,
1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: ANNOTATED FOR LEGISLATORS 19 (4th ed. 2005) (giving
examples of power overlaps, including General Assembly holding witnesses in contempt and
impeaching state officers).
205. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 92 N.E. at 833. For a description of the variety of ways in which the
Illinois Constitution explicitly authorizes individual branches to exercise powers that would
conventionally be thought to belong to coordinate branches, see DODD & DODD, supra note 196,
at 102–04 (discussing impeachment proceedings of a “purely judicial” character designated by
the constitution to the House); see also SAMUEL K. GOVE ET AL., THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE:
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 2 (1976) (“Although the lines separating each of the three branches of
state government have never been completely clear, the essential responsibility of the General
Assembly has always been that of enacting statute law.” (citation omitted)).
206. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 92 N.E. at 833.
207. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (Ill. 1997) (citing Burleigh v.
Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357 (Ill. 1997)) (holding invalid an attempted delegation of an executive or
administrative function to the judicial branch); Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 645
N.E.2d 946 (Ill. 1994) (holding invalid attempted delegation of legislative decision making to the
judiciary); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 744 (Ill. 1976) (holding
invalid an attempted delegation of judicial power to nonjudicial member of medical malpractice
review board); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ill. 1952) (“If the power is
judicial in its nature, it necessarily follows that the legislature is expressly prohibited from
exercising it.”).
208. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078 (noting that “our state constitution does not define legislative,
executive, and judicial power” (citing People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 892 (Ill. 1988)));
People v. Hammond, 959 N.E.2d 29, 44 (Ill. 2011) (citing Walker, 519 N.E. at 893); Witter v.
Cook Cty. Comm’rs, 100 N.E. 148, 149 (Ill. 1912) (“[O]ur constitution does not attempt to define
legislative, executive and judicial power, as it is neither practicable nor possible to enumerate the
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legislative power as “the power to enact laws or declare what the laws
shall be”;209 the executive power as “that power which compels
obedience to the laws and executes them”;210 and the judicial power as
“the power which adjudicates upon the rights of citizens, and to that end
construes and applies the law.”211 Notwithstanding these superficially
clear categories, determining precisely when one branch exercises
power that intrudes on the prerogatives of another branch can be a
difficult undertaking. In fact, there have been very few Illinois court
decisions addressing separation-of-powers challenges.212
In sum, the history and structure of the Illinois Constitution indicates
that over time the dominant powers of the legislative branch have been
scaled back significantly, and that the current constitution’s provision
for broad executive veto powers indicates the citizenry’s desire for
balanced powers between the political branches and among all branches
of the government. It is this constitutional fine balancing that the
legislative veto threatens to throw out of whack.
1. No Encroachment on Executive Powers.
The Illinois courts are unlikely to deem legislative interference with
agency rulemaking to be a stand-alone violation of the separation-ofpowers language of section one of Article II of the Illinois Constitution.
The chief reason is that rulemaking powers have never been
characterized by the state courts as purely “executive” in nature, nor is
there anything in the state constitution that specifically delegates
rulemaking powers to the executive branch. Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that historically the rulemaking power has been a core
executive function either in Illinois or in other jurisdictions. To the
contrary, rulemaking power has been described by the Illinois courts as
“quasi-legislative” in nature, because the authority to makes rules has
been delegated by the legislature and the rules themselves have the

myriad powers of government and to declare that a given power belongs exclusively to one
branch for all time.”); see also id. (“[A]rticle 3 of the Illinois Constitution does not mean that the
legislative, executive and judicial powers shall be kept so entirely dependent upon each other.”).
209. People v. Hawkinson, 155 N.E. 318, 319 (Ill. 1927).
210. Witter, 100 N.E. at 149.
211. Hawkinson, 155 N.E. at 319.
212. See LOUSIN, supra note 196, at 81 (cases “involving alleged encroachments by the
legislative branch upon the executive branch or vice versa are especially rare”); see also id.
(noting that such challenges frequently involve allegations that the legislature improperly
delegated legislative authority to the executive).
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force of law.213
In addition, administrative agencies possess the authority to create
rules only because the legislature has delegated that power to them.
While administrative agencies are part of the executive branch, they are
creatures of statute and have no power beyond their enabling statutes.
“It is fundamental that an administrative body has only such powers as
are granted in the statute creating it.”214 Although the enforcement of
rules is inherently an executive function,215 there is nothing inherently
executive about the promulgation of rules. Indeed, the typical
complaint of parties aggrieved by agency rules is that the agency
violated separation-of-powers principles by exercising legislative
power.216
The suggestion that JCAR or General Assembly interference with
agency rulemaking—whether through a legislative veto or (equally

213. Radaszewski v. Garner, 805 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); see also Monsanto Co.
v. Pollution Control Bd., 367 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ill. 1977) (referring to an agency’s “quasilegislative power to make prospective regulations and orders”); Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Ill.
Pollution Control Bd., 684 N.E.2d 837, 840–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“When an administrative
agency such as the [Illinois Pollution Control] Board exercises its rulemaking powers, it is
performing a quasi-legislative function” (citing Ill. State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution
Control Bd., 532 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988))); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ill. Commerce
Comm’n, 644 N.E.2d 817, 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he administrative rules and regulations
[the Illinois Commerce Commission] promulgates, acting in its quasi-legislative capacity, enjoy a
presumption of validity.”). As Chief Justice Roberts observed recently about administrative
agencies generally, they fit “most comfortably within the Executive Branch,” but “as a practical
matter they exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law.” City
of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice’s point was that administrative agencies exercise an amalgam of powers, and he went on
to explain that the agencies also exercise “executive power, by policing compliance with those
regulations; and judicial power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on
those found to have violated their rules.” Id.
214. People ex rel. Thompson v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 317 N.E.2d 121, 126 (Ill. App. Ct.
1974).
215. S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
216. It is “well settled” that the General Assembly may delegate rulemaking authority to an
administrative agency, so long as it “establishes standards under which the agency’s discretion
may be exercised.” S. 51 Development Corp., 781 N.E.2d at 535 (citing Sch. Dist. No. 79 v. Cty.
Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Lake Cty., 123 N.E.2d 475, 476 (Ill. 1954)); see also Hoogasian v. Reg’l
Transp. Agency, 317 N.E.2d 534, 541 (Ill. 1974) (“It is well settled that notwithstanding the rule
that the General Assembly cannot delegate its general legislative power to others, it may
authorize others to do things which it might properly do but cannot do as understandingly or as
advantageously itself, if the authority thus granted is delimited by intelligible standards.”); Dep’t
of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 95 N.E.2d 903, 906 (Ill. 1950) (stating it is
“well settled” that the General Assembly may “delegate its powers to an administrative agency, as
long as it does not invest such agency with arbitrary powers, or delegate its general legislative
authority.”).
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plausibly) through legislation passed pursuant to ordinary constitutional
enactment provisions—is an encroachment on executive powers that
represents a stand-alone separation-of-powers violation would seem to
be a nonstarter. Of course, it is a different question whether the
legislature interfered with an agency’s rulemaking authority in a
constitutionally proper manner. That is a question to be addressed in
Part III.B, below.
2. Probable Encroachment on Judicial Powers.
Although it seems clear that legislative interference with agency
rulemaking does not encroach on executive powers, it is a more difficult
question whether the legislative veto scheme currently in place in
Illinois encroaches on judicial powers. That is because JCAR and the
General Assembly are authorized to block implementation of agency
rules upon concluding, among other possibilities, that the agency has
acted beyond its authority in promulgating its rules,217 which is a
determination that would seem to be inherently judicial in nature.
Broadly speaking, in the “context of the interplay between the
legislature and the judiciary,” the separation-of-powers provision “has
been interpreted to mean that it is the legislature’s role to make the law,
and the judiciary’s role to interpret the law.”218 Although there have
been few Illinois cases addressing separation-of-powers issues between
the legislative and executive branches, there are many instances where
the courts have concluded that the legislature had sought to exercise
judicial power in violation of the separation-of-powers provision of the
Illinois Constitution.219 For example, the courts have found legislative
encroachment when the General Assembly passed legislation that

217. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-110(a) (2016) (“The Joint Committee shall examine any
proposed rule . . . to determine whether the proposed rule . . . is within the statutory authority
upon which it is based.”).
218. Bates v. Bd. of Educ., 555 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1990) (citing Roth v. Yackley, 396 N.E.2d
520 (Ill. 1979)).
219. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (Ill. 1997)(“In furtherance of
the authority of the judiciary to carry out its constitutional obligations, the legislature is
prohibited from enacting laws that unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of judges.” (citations
omitted)); see also People v. Davis, 442 N.E.2d 855, 857–58 (Ill. 1982) (“The General Assembly
has the power to enact laws governing judicial practice only where they do not unduly infringe
upon the inherent powers of the judiciary.” (citing Strukoff v. Strukoff, 389 N.E.2d 1170 (Ill.
1979))); id. at 858 (“Furthermore, it is the undisputed duty of the court to protect its judicial
powers from encroachment by legislative enactments, and thus preserve an independent judicial
department.” (citing Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713 (Ill. 1952))); People v. Callopy,
192 N.E. 634 (Ill. 1934)).
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allowed the prosecution and defense in criminal trials to question
prospective jurors,220 that created a special panel of circuit judges to
decide election contests,221 and that set the conditions under which a
convict could go free on bail during appellate proceedings.222
It is, of course, the archetype of the judicial function to declare what
the law is and to apply the law to disputes in front of the court.223
Determining whether or not an agency has acted beyond its authority in
promulgating a rule is certainly part of the judicial power, and it is one
that has been exercised by the Illinois courts on many occasions. 224 But
it does not follow from these observations that the General Assembly
(or a committee of the legislature) necessarily encroaches on the judicial
powers when it exercises its statutory authority to review the lawfulness
of agency regulations.225
Consider that the General Assembly may disapprove of the manner in
which an administrative agency is engaged in its rulemaking, perhaps
because the legislative body believes the agency has misunderstood the
authority granted to it by its enabling legislation. If the General
Assembly, consistent with the enactment provisions of the Illinois
Constitution, passes a statute clarifying, modifying, or eliminating
altogether the agency’s authority to pass such rules, there can be no
doubt that it is properly exercising its legislative authority, even if what
motivated the statutory enactment was the legislature’s conclusion that
the agency had acted unlawfully.
Nonetheless, legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking are not
comparable to legislation that amends or corrects statutory grants of
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies. To be lawful, statutory
modifications must be prospective in effect, and may not be used to
overrule a court’s interpretation of the agency’s authority under the
220. People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602, 603–04 (Ill. 1977).
221. In re Contest of Election for Offices of Governor & Lieutenant Governor, 444 N.E.2d
170, 172 (Ill. 1983).
222. People v. Williams, 577 N.E.2d 762, 764–65 (Ill. 1991).
223. Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338, 356 (1917) (“The province of courts is to declare what the
law is, and apply it to the controversy before them.”).
224. See, e.g., People v. Roos, 514 N.E.2d 993, 998 (Ill. 1987) (holding that a Department of
Registration and Education rule prohibiting licenses to acupuncturists was void); Cent. Ill. Pub.
Serv. v. Commerce Comm’n, 644 N.E.2d 817, 821–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Granite City Div. of
Nat’l Steel Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719, 724–25 (Ill. 1993).
225. Though when confronted with this question, the Kentucky Supreme Court thought the
answer was obvious: “It requires no citation of authority to state unequivocally that such a
determination is a judicial matter and is within the purview of the judiciary.” Legis. Research
Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 919 (Ky. 1984).
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original statute.226 As the Illinois Supreme Court has explained,
although “the General Assembly can pass legislation to prospectively
change a judicial construction of a statute if it believes that the judicial
interpretation was at odds with legislative intent, it cannot effect a
change in that construction by a later declaration of what it had
originally intended.”227 In other words, the General Assembly may not,
after the courts have interpreted a statute, on its own declare what the
correct interpretation of the statute is.
The JCAR or General Assembly veto arguably invites the legislature
to intrude on the judicial power in a similar manner. It is true that a
legislative veto is unlikely to be issued on the ground that an agency has
acted beyond its statutory authority if a state court has already
determined that the agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority is
correct. But whenever a legislative body issues a veto it will
nonetheless be supplanting the court in the first instance by determining
the proper construction of the enabling statute. The legislature will, in
short, be sitting in judgment on the agency’s interpretation of the
statutory authority granted to it by the legislature.
Determining whether agency action was authorized by statute is the
essence of what judges do. Challenges to agency rules and regulations
are decided by the courts in the same manner as challenges to statutes;
they “must be construed under the same standards which govern
construction of statutes” and they “enjoy a presumption of validity,” just
as statutes do.228 Legislatures, in contrast, pass laws rather than pass
judgment on whether those laws are being interpreted and executed
properly.
It should be of no consequence that members of JCAR or of the
General Assembly believe themselves to have more insight into the
intent of the drafters of a statute that delegated rulemaking authority to
an agency. Neither the General Assembly as a whole, nor a small
subset of its members, stands in a more authoritative position than the
courts to determine the legislative intent behind a statute, particularly
where the statute that is being examined was passed by a prior assembly
of the legislature.229
In addition, allowing JCAR or the General Assembly to supplant the

226.
227.
228.
229.

Bates v. Bd. of Educ., 555 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1990).
Id. (citing Roth v. Yackley, 396 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 1979)).
N. Ill. Auto Wreckers & Rebuilders Ass’n v. Dixon, 387 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ill. 1979).
Cf. Legislative Research Comm’n, 664 S.W.2d at 919.
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judiciary in determining whether agencies are properly exercising
statutory authority would grant the legislature a windfall of power. The
General Assembly would be in a position to make broad and
nonspecific grants of authority to agencies, secure in knowing that it
could at a later date lessen its delegation of authority to the executive
branch through a narrowing interpretation of the statute. In contrast, the
courts show great deference to agency interpretations of their enabling
statutes,230 exercising what in the federal system is called “Chevron
deference,”231 and deferring to the agency staff’s expertise and
experience.232 Thus, “administrative action taken under statutory
authority will not be set aside [by the courts] unless it has been clearly
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.”233
230. The mobius-like question of whether the courts in Illinois should, consistent with
separation-of-powers principles, show deference to the determination by a state agency that the
General Assembly has delegated particular powers to that agency is beyond the scope of this
Article. A similar debate is simmering in the federal system now over whether the federal courts
owe Chevron deference to agency conclusions about the scope of delegations to the agency by
congressional statutes. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (characterizing the issue in the case as “whether the authority of administrative
agencies should be augmented . . . to include not only broad power to give definitive answers to
questions left to them by Congress, but also the same power to decide when Congress has given
them that power”). The Illinois courts, in contrast, are clear at present that it is the role of the
judiciary rather than an agency to determine the legitimate scope of the agency’s statutory
authority. See People v. Roos, 514 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Ill. 1987) (“Although courts give substantial
weight and deference to an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with the
administration and enforcement of the statute, such interpretations are not binding on the
courts.”); People ex rel. Thompson v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 317 N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ill. App. Ct.
1974) (“Where the authority of an administrative body is in question the determination of the
scope of its power and authority is a judicial function; not a question to be finally determined by
the administrative agency itself.”).
231. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984).
232. The courts give agency interpretations of rulemaking authority deference because they
have been “appointed by law and informed by experience.” Monarch Gas Co. v. Ill. Commerce
Comm’n, 366 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
233. Ill. Coal Operators Ass’n v. Pollution Control Bd., 319 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ill. 1974)
(upholding the Pollution Control Board’s sound-emission regulations where the court could not
conclude they were clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious); see also Monsanto Co. v.
Pollution Control Bd., 367 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ill. 1977) (“When a regulation is promulgated by an
agency pursuant to a grant of legislative power, a reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment as to the content of the regulation, because the legislature has placed the power to create
such regulations in the agency and not in the court.” (citation omitted)); Midwest Petroleum
Marketers Ass’n v. City of Chi., 402 N.E.2d 709, 715 (Ill. 1980) (“A reviewing court may set
aside administrative regulations only if they are clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”);
Rend Lake Coll. Fed’n of Teachers v. Bd. of Cmty. Coll., 405 N.E.2d 364, 368 (Ill. 1980)
(“Reviewing courts may interfere with the construction and application of regulations only where
administrative interpretation is plainly erroneous.”); Bio-Medical Labs, Inc. v. Trainor, 370
N.E.2d 223, 233 (Ill. 1977). The IAPA includes a provision for judicial review of agency
adjudications. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-110 (2016) (“The findings and conclusions of the
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It should likewise be of no consequence that judicial powers can in
certain circumstances be exercised by the executive and legislative
branches. Certainly, administrative agencies not only exercise “quasilegislative” power when promulgating rules, but also “quasi-judicial”
power when adjudicating enforcement actions for those who are alleged
to have violated their rules.234 The General Assembly likewise
exercises power that is judicial in nature, such as when it hosts
impeachment proceedings. But the exercise of the impeachment and
trial power is constitutionally delegated to the legislature, 235 and
therefore represents no separation-of-powers problem. In contrast,
sitting in judgment of agency interpretations of statutory grants would
seem to encroach on core judicial functions and therefore would be
unconstitutional.
B. Enactment Issues
The conclusion thus far is that the Illinois legislative veto scheme is
unlikely to be deemed by the courts to represent an encroachment on
executive branch powers as a stand-alone separation-of-powers
violation, but that the scheme may allow unconstitutional legislative
encroachment on the judiciary’s powers. To be sure, the latter issue is
in particular a difficult one. But it is unlikely that the Illinois courts
would need to consider either of the stand-alone separation-of-powers
arguments, because it is abundantly clear that JCAR and General
Assembly vetoes are unlawful due to their failure to comply with
Illinois constitutional enactment provisions.
Legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking by either a three-fifths vote
of JCAR or a joint resolution of the General Assembly should be
administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.”); see
Winakor v. Annunzio, 99 N.E.2d 191, 197 (Ill. 1951) (“[I]t is fundamental that an erroneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency is not binding upon the courts.”). But it
does not include a provision for the review of agency rules, leaving the courts to apply commonlaw rules. Robert Burns, Judicial Enforcement of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act’s
Rulemaking Provisions, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383, 404 (1979).
234. See, e.g., Monsanto, 367 N.E.2d at 689 (finding that a decision of Pollution Control
Board about whether to grant a variance under the Illinois Equal Protection Act was “essentially
quasi-judicial”); Kalisz v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n, 510 N.E.2d 1103, 1105–06 (Ill. 1987) (“Whether any
given proceeding by an administrative or executive body is quasi-judicial depends upon the
powers and duties of the body conducting the proceeding and upon the nature of the proceedings
themselves.”); cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that administrative agencies can be said to exercise “judicial power, by
adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have violated their
rules”).
235. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
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deemed unconstitutional under Illinois law because they are legislative
acts (that is, acts that have the “purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative
branch”236) that fail to comply with the enactment requirements of the
Illinois Constitution.237
The General Assembly does its work through the passage of
resolutions and bills. As new members are advised upon taking office,
resolutions are “ways of expressing opinions or doing a variety of things
except enacting laws,” while bills are used to enact laws.238
Resolutions do no more than express the mood of the legislature.
Whether adopted by a single house or jointly by both houses, they can
have no binding legal effect on the rights of any person or body.
Resolutions are not laws, cannot become laws, and do not have the
effect of law. As the Illinois Supreme Court has explained,
nothing becomes law simply and solely because men who possess the
legislative power will that it shall be, unless they express their
determination to that effect in the mode pointed out by the instrument
which invests them with the power, and under all the forms which that
instrument has rendered essential.239

The General Assembly may make laws only by passing bills, 240 and
to be lawful those bills must comply with the enactment requirements
set forth in sections eight and nine of article four of the constitution.
Chief among these are the bicameralism and presentment requirements:
“No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the
members elected to each House,”241 and “[e]very bill passed by the
General Assembly shall be presented to the Governor within 30

236. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); see also BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 505–06
(noting that all legislative veto schemes that do not require presentment to the executive “alter
existing legal rights or duties by means less than statutory” and are therefore “likely to violate
most state constitutions because they amount to the enactment of legislation by improper
means”).
237. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (holding that once Congress delegates
rulemaking to an executive agency, the legislature may only control the promulgation of rules
“indirectly” through the passage of new laws).
238. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, PREFACE TO LAWMAKING: LEGISLATORS’
INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, chs. 1, 3 (2010). The houses of the General
Assembly may also pass motions, which are used to control the internal operations of the House
and Senate. Id.
239. People ex rel. Burritt v. Comm’rs of State Contracts, 11 N.E. 180, 185 (Ill. 1887).
240. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 2; see also LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT,, supra note 238,
at chs. 2, 7 (“Laws can be enacted only by bills—not by resolutions or other measures.”).
241. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 3.
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calendar days after its passage.”242
The legislative review scheme currently in place allows the General
Assembly to exercise legislative power that does not comply with these
enactment provisions. Whenever the General Assembly votes by joint
resolution to permanently suspend an agency rule to which JCAR has
objected, the legislative body is altering the legal rights and duties of
those entities that would have been governed by the agency’s rules.
Because the General Assembly veto would be accomplished by
resolution rather than by passage of a bill that was presented to the
Governor for a potential executive veto, the legislative act cannot have
the force of law.243 Similarly, if JCAR were to object to an agency rule
and prohibit its implementation, and the General Assembly were
subsequently to fail to lift JCAR prohibition (thereby making it
permanent), not only would the legislature have failed to comply with
the presentment requirement, but it also would have failed to meet the
bicameralism requirement of the constitution.244
In addition to failing to comply with the bicameralism and
presentment requirements, JCAR or General Assembly vetoes of agency
rulemaking do not satisfy a host of other requirements specified in the
Illinois Constitution for passage of bills by the legislature. Some of
these other requirements include that laws contain an enacting clause,245
that the final passage of a bill be done by record vote,246 that the bill be
read by title on three different days in each house, and that it be
reproduced and placed on the desk of each member.247
An argument that has been offered against the foregoing analysis is
that the enactment requirements of the Illinois Constitution are
nonetheless satisfied because the statutes that created JCAR and
General Assembly legislative veto regime248 were duly passed by the
legislature as ordinary bills, with bicameralism, presentment, and all
other constitutional enactment provisions respected.249 With good

242. Id. art. IV, § 9.
243. See, e.g., Gen. Assembly of State of N.J. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982); State
v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980).
244. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 3.
245. “Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General
Assembly.” Id. art. IV, § 8, cl. 1.
246. Id. art. IV, § 8, cl. 3.
247. Id. art. IV, § 8, cl. 4.
248. See supra Part I (discussing the General Assembly veto era).
249. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 40, Caro ex rel. State v. Blagojevich, 895 N.E.2d
1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 08-1061). In this brief, which grew out of the same JCAR veto
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reason, this argument has been roundly rejected when raised in other
states.250 A legislature should not be allowed to delegate powers to
itself by statute that it is not constitutionally authorized to possess, even
with the acquiescence of the governor.251 In Illinois, legislative acts
must be accomplished through laws that have complied with
constitutional enactment requirements, and no statute can exempt the
legislature from these constitutional requirements.252
Although there are no judicial opinions in Illinois that have addressed
the constitutionality of JCAR or General Assembly vetoes of agency
rulemaking,253 the Illinois Supreme Court case of Quinn v. Donnewald
merits some attention in the context of this discussion.254 At issue in
that led in part to Governor Blagojevich’s impeachment, the Illinois Attorney General argued that
the legality of legislative vetoes had already been decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in Quinn
v. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ill. 1985).
250. See, e.g., Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 2000); Mo. Coal. for the Env’t
v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); State ex rel. Stephan v.
Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984); Legislative Research Comm’n v.
Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984); State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
251. In the last analysis, it should be for the courts rather than the political branches to
determine whether there has been a violation of separation-of-powers principles. Cf. NLRB v.
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2594 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). Indeed, the vitality of separation
of powers “does not depend [on] whether the encroached-upon branch approves the
encroachment.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Com. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497
(2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As Justice Scalia opined about the
Chadha case recently in a concurring opinion in NLRB v. Canning, it is no support to the
argument that the legislative veto is lawful to point out that the executive signed legislation
authorizing Congress to utilize it. “Just the opposite: We said the other branches’ enthusiasm for
the legislative veto ‘sharpened rather than blunted’ our review.” Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2594.
252. A.L.I.V.E., 606 P.2d at 777 (“[W]hile the legislature can delegate the power to make laws
conditionally, the condition must be lawful and may not contain a grant of power to any branch of
government to function in a manner prohibited by the constitution.”).
253. There are Illinois court decisions in which a JCAR objection to an agency’s proposed
regulations is addressed, but those cases do not involve a JCAR or General Assembly veto.
Rather, the cases involves challenges to rules on the grounds that JCAR objections did not, either
directly or through General Assembly passage of a joint resolution, lead to the permanent
suspension of the rules. See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 644 N.E.2d 817,
824–25 (Ill. 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that JCAR, once it challenged Illinois
Commerce Commission regulations, was not allowed to retract its objection before the General
Assembly could vote to pass a joint resolution making JCAR’s suspension of the regulation
permanent); S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (same, in the
context of short-term lending rules promulgated by the Illinois Department of Financial
Institutions); cf. Reece v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 767 N.E.2d 395, 398–403 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a statutory scheme allowing the General Assembly
to accept or reject by joint resolution recommendations from the State Board of Education about
physical education waivers for schools was an unconstitutional variation on a legislative veto,
because the General Assembly accepted the board’s recommendations and therefore there was no
legislative veto for the court to consider).
254. 483 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ill. 1985).
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Donnewald were salary recommendations made by the Compensation
Review Board (“CRB”), a body created by the state’s Compensation
Review Act, for judges, constitutional officers, and members of the
General Assembly.255 The twelve members of the CRB—private
citizens appointed in equal numbers by the majority and minority
leaders of the House and Senate—were required by statute to make their
salary recommendations in a report. The recommendations would then
go into effect unless a majority of each house of the General Assembly
voted to disapprove the report.
In Donnewald, the General Assembly failed to pass such a joint
resolution, and the salaries the CRB recommended went into effect.
Citing INS v. Chadha, the plaintiffs challenged the salary
recommendation scheme, arguing it set up a variation of an
unconstitutional legislative veto. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to
address this argument on the ground that the constitutionality of
legislative vetoes was not properly before it, noting that because the
General Assembly did not pass a joint resolution disapproving of the
report, there had been no legislative veto.256
Nonetheless, there are two reasons the Donnewald decision should
give pause to anyone who presumes to know how the Illinois Supreme
Court will rule on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes in the state.
The first reason for caution concerns another of the plaintiffs’
challenges—that the General Assembly had improperly delegated
legislative power to the CRB by authorizing the board to set salaries for
government officials.257 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this
argument too, in part on the ground that the General Assembly had
never intended to delegate to the CRB the power to establish salaries in
the first place.258 Evidence for this conclusion was that the legislature
had retained for itself the power to reject the CRB’s recommendations
through possible passage of a joint resolution. The implication of the
court’s observation was that a General Assembly joint resolution veto of
CRB salary recommendations would have legal effect. This implication
sits uncomfortably with the prospect that such legislative vetoes are
nonetheless unconstitutional.
The other aspect of Donnewald that should give pause is the Illinois

255.
256.
257.
258.

25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-6.3 (2016).
Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d at 222.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 220.
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Supreme Court’s response to the plaintiffs’ argument that the whole
CRB scheme was unconstitutional because it allowed salaries to be set
in a manner that did not accord with the state constitution’s
bicameralism and presentment requirements.259 The court rejected this
argument as well, observing that the Compensation Review Act itself
was passed in conformance with bicameralism and presentment
requirements.
This rationale superficially lends support to the
suggestion that the exercise of legislative vetoes is permissible so long
as the statute that created the legislative veto schemes was itself passed
in accord with constitutional enactment requirements. In fact, the
Illinois Attorney General cited Donnewald as precedent for precisely
this point in briefing for the Caro v. Blagojevich case, in which it
initially appeared that the Illinois courts would have to decide whether
the Governor could lawfully order his administrative agencies to ignore
suspension orders from JCAR and the General Assembly.260
The reasoning in Donnewald, however, does not bear the weight the
Attorney General placed on it in her briefing in Caro. As noted above,
the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly stated in its opinion that it was not
reaching the legislative veto question.261 This is important, because the
court’s reasoning about constitutional enactment issues was not
addressed to activity by the General Assembly or one of its legislative
committees. The activity the court considered was the issuance of the
salary report by the CRB. As a committee of private citizens, the CRB
may be delegated quasi-legislative powers, but—just like an
administrative agency—need not itself act in conformance with
constitutional lawmaking requirements because the committee is not
comprised of legislators. The only other activity that was properly
before the court was the conduct of the General Assembly in passing the
legislation that created the CRB (which, as the court noted, was done in
accord with bicameralism and presentment requirements) and in failing
to pass a joint resolution to kill the CRB’s salary recommendations
(which, as the court again noted, was a failure to act rather than an act).
In short, the Donnewald decision tells us vanishingly little about how
the Illinois Supreme Court will rule on the question of the
constitutionality of legislative vetoes in the state.

259. Id. at 222.
260. See Brief for Intervenor the State of Illinois at 9, Caro ex rel. State v. Blagojevich, 895
N.E.2d 1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 08-1061).
261. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d at 222.
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C. The Importance of House Bill 398
As noted above, the first real test of the legitimacy of JCAR and
General Assembly vetoes came after Governor Rod Blagojevich
characterized JCAR activity as advisory only, and directed his
Department of Health and Family Services to ignore a JCAR
prohibition of its proposed rules about Medicaid eligibility—which led
to lawsuits, articles of impeachment, and eventual removal of the
Governor from office in 2009.262 Although the courts did not rule on
the constitutionality of the legislative veto, the General Assembly surely
understood that the aftermath of the Governor’s removal was a
propitious time for shoring up its legislative veto scheme.
The body did so by passing House Bill 398 in February 2009, just
one month after Blagojevich was removed from office. The bill, which
was signed into law by the new Governor, Patrick Quinn, states that
“[a]ll rulemaking authority” exercised after the IAPA’s effective date
“is conditioned on the rules being adopted in accordance with all
provisions of this Act and all rules and procedures of the Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR).”263 In case the import of
this first part is unclear, the IAPA goes on to state that “any purported
rule not so adopted, for whatever reason, including without limitation a
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction holding any part of this Act
or the rules or procedures of JCAR invalid, is unauthorized.”264
It is understandable that the General Assembly wanted desperately to
maintain supervisory powers over administrative agency rulemaking.265
But House Bill 398 was a risky bit of legislation. By its plain terms, it
declared all agency rules to be of no effect if they were not subjected to
review and a potential veto by JCAR or the General Assembly, even if
the courts had ruled those procedures to be unlawful.266 By passing this
262. Act of Feb. 26, 2009, Pub. Act. 96-002.
263. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-6 (2016).
264. Id.
265. During the House debate, Representative Hannig said that House Bill 398 was “one of
the most important Bills that we’ll deal with in this Legislative Session. This deal[s] with the
very essence of the Legislative Branch.” H.R., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. Assemb., 8th
Sess., at 20 (Ill. Feb. 5, 2009) (statement of Rep. Hannig); see also id. at 20 (statement of Rep.
Leitch) (“Whether you recognize it or not, . . . this is one of the most important Bills that we will
ever have come before us.”).
266. Senator Clayborne described the measure as an act “to require an administrative agency
seeking to promulgate rules to adhere to the rules and procedures of JCAR even if a court finds,
for example, JCAR’s power to suspend rules is unconstitutional.” S., Transcript of Debates, 96th
Gen. Assemb., 13th Sess., at 11 (Ill. Feb. 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Clayborne). When asked
whether this provision meant that if rules were promulgated that had not gone “before the Joint
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legislation, the members of the General Assembly seem to have been
betting that the courts would be dissuaded from doing so, because the
consequences of such a ruling might be cataclysmic. In a word, the
combined effect of House Bill 398 and a ruling that the JCAR veto
scheme was unconstitutional would be to bring to a complete stop all
future agency rulemaking, because no rule could ever comply with all
of JCAR procedures if those procedures are disallowed by the courts.
House Bill 398 is, in a word, a species of doomsday legislation.
It is certainly possible that legislators in the General Assembly did
not understand the effect that House Bill 398 might have on the
prospects of agency rulemaking if the Illinois courts were to rule that
legislative vetoes are unconstitutional. The floor debates about the
measure do not evidence a nuanced understanding of the constitutional
issues raised by JCAR and General Assembly vetoes, and instead
suggest that the legislators were under the impression that House Bill
398 would do no more than clarify that the General Assembly wanted
JCAR review of agency rulemaking to be mandatory rather than merely
advisory.267 For example, Representative Leitch stated that the measure
simply
clarifies a long-standing issue . . . [of tension between the Executive
and Legislative Branches] and establishes without any question or
confusion the rights of this Legislative Body to prohibit rulemaking by
the Executive Branch that does not comport with the legislative intent
of measures that have been passed here in this General Assembly.268

The impression left from the debate was that the legislature, incensed
by Governor Blagojevich’s allegedly willful misunderstanding of
JCAR’s statutory authority, passed House Bill 398 simply to make it
clear that JCAR had statutorily sanctioned coercive powers over
administrative agencies.269

Committee, that they would be determined to be illegal or inappropriate and not applicable,” id. at
12 (statement of Sen. Rutherford), his answer was that the observation was correct, id. at 12
(statement of Sen. Clayborne).
267. See H.R., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen. Assemb., 8th Sess., at 13 (Ill. Feb. 5, 2009)
(statement of Rep. Hannig) (“The former Governor filed a lawsuit and he argues in the courts that
JCAR is advisory.”); id. (stement of Rep. Bost) (“I think it’s a shame that we’ve had to go down
this path where there was no question before by any statewide elected official or any Member of
this chamber or the other chambers in all the years that JCAR has been in existence of what their
importance is.”).
268. Id. at 18 (statement of Rep. Leitch).
269. How, some senators wanted to know, was this legislation supposed to function? “I read,”
said Senator Rutherford, “that if rules are promulgated and a court finds that the Administrative
Code or the Joint Committee [is] invalid—help me understand the logic how this statute could
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Nonetheless, the text of House Bill 398 does more than clarify the
General Assembly’s intent to give JCAR review some teeth. It is
fashioned in the manner of nonseverability legislation, so that agency
rulemaking will be brought to a halt if the legislative veto provisions of
the IAPA are eventually ruled unconstitutional. Even so, the Illinois
courts should not let legislative threats of self-harm affect their analysis
of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes over agency rulemaking.
House Bill 398 adds nothing to the calculus of whether, for example,
the exercise of legislative vetoes is an unconstitutional attempt to wield
legislative power without meeting the constitutional bicameralism and
presentment requirements. Nor, for that matter, does House Bill 398
make it less likely that the JCAR legislative veto scheme represents an
unconstitutional encroachment on the judicial power to declare what the
law is.270
The suspension of a system that allows the legislature to delegate
rulemaking authority to agencies would be a self-inflicted wound that
the General Assembly could easily cure by the statutory repeal of House
Bill 398.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
This Article has argued that in time the Illinois courts will strike
down as unconstitutional JCAR and General Assembly veto provisions
of the Illinois Administrative Procedures Act. When and if that
happens, the state will be left with the question of what, if anything,
should replace the current system of legislative review of agency
rulemaking. This Part will briefly canvas some alternatives to the
legislative veto that would survive constitutional scrutiny.
There are compelling reasons to assure that the General Assembly
has meaningful oversight of administrative agency rulemaking.
Agencies do in fact sometimes act beyond their statutory authority when
promulgating rules, and they sometimes issue unwise rules that are
still have those rules continue to have the force of law.” S., Transcript of Debates, 96th Gen.
Assemb., 13th Sess., at 12 (Ill. Feb. 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Rutherford). Senator
Clayborne’s response was, “I assume that because this is voluntary, that maybe the court will
view this a little differently and say that the agency had the ability either not to promulgate rules
or to promulgate rules, and when they decide to promulgate rules, then they decide to abide by
our existing rules.” Id. at 12 (statement of Sen. Clayborne); see also id. (“[T]his is voluntary. I
mean, they can volunteer not to promulgate rules, but if they decide to promulgate rules, then
they’ll abide by the rules of JCAR.”).
270. Indeed, if anything, it would have the effect of making it more likely that the legislative
veto scheme is a separation-of-powers problem. See infra Part II.A.
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arguably contrary to the public health, welfare, and safety. Although in
an ideal world the solution to agency overreach and insipience would be
to keep the rulemaking business in the hands of our democratically
elected representatives in the legislature, the reality of the modern
administrative states makes this option untenable. There are too many
subjects requiring too much expertise to make it feasible for legislators
to draft rules with sufficient specificity and in sufficient numbers to
effectuate the underlying purposes of their legislation.271
There is no real possibility that the General Assembly will leave
unused its power to delegate rulemaking authority to administrative
agencies.272 The question then remains—what kind of legislative
oversight of the agencies’ rulemaking activities would both comport
with constitutional requirements and represent good policy?
A first option is very straightforward. If the legislative veto—as
exercised either by the General Assembly or by JCAR—is
unconstitutional, then simply amend the Illinois Constitution to allow
for legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking. Such a course of action
may or may not be wise, but there is a procedure for amending the
Illinois Constitution, and an amendment would provide a clean
resolution to the kinds of constitutional questions raised in this
Article.273 A similar amendment strategy has been used elsewhere,
including in Iowa,274 Connecticut,275 Nevada,276 South Carolina,277 and
New Jersey.278
271. Each year administrative agencies in Illinois produce about 20,000 pages of rules. H.R.,
Transcript of Debates, 95th Gen. Assemb., 299th Sess. (Ill. Jan. 8, 2009) (statement of Andrew P.
Morriss, Professor, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign), http://www.ilga.gov/house/committees/
95Documents/Committee%20Exhibit%2050.pdf.
272. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-5 (2016).
273. There are three ways to amend the Illinois Constitution. The first is through a
constitutional convention, ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1, the second is through a legislatively referred
constitutional amendment, id. art. XIV, § 2, and the last (for amendments to article IV of the
constitution only, relating to structural and procedural subjects concerning the General Assembly)
is through an initiated constitutional amendment, id. art. XIV, § 3.
274. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 40 (allowing legislature to stop implementation of agency rule by
joint resolution).
275. CONN. CONST. art. 2 (allowing agency rules to be blocked by legislature or a committee
of the legislature as prescribed by law); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-170, 4-171 (2015).
276. NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (allowing the legislature to nullify agency rules by majority vote
of both houses).
277. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 18 (allowing joint resolutions to have the effect of law); Letter
from Edwin E. Evans, Deputy Attorney Gen. of S.C., to Edwin E. Bowen, Jr., 1986 S.C. Op.
Atty. Gen. No. 86-76, 1986 WL 192034 (July 8, 1986) (concluding that the legislative veto
process of agency rulemaking was constitutional due to the passage of section 18 of article III).
278. N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 4, ¶ 6 (allowing the legislature to stop implementation of agency
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Whether amending the constitution to allow a legislative veto of
agency rulemaking would be a good idea is a different question. There
are strong arguments in support of legislative vetoes, not least Justice
White’s observation in his dissent in Chadha that it is the only practical
way for a legislature to oversee the important power that it must entrust
to the executive branch.279 Arguments have also been advanced that
agency oversight via legislative veto retains democratic legitimacy (by
allowing the General Assembly to have the final word on rulemaking
powers that are essentially legislative in nature), promotes political
accountability (by leaving final responsibility for rules in the hands of
elected legislators), and leaves policy decisions where they belong, with
elected representatives of the people rather than unelected appointees of
the governor.280 Legislatures are accountable to the public, arguably
know best the nature of the authority they delegated to the agencies, and
are able to efficiently give feedback to the agencies if they are
authorized to wield veto power.281
On the other side of the ledger, schemes allowing for legislative
vetoes of agency rulemaking have been widely critiqued, including
most comprehensively by Arthur Earl Bonfield in his classic State
Administrative Rule Making.282 Among the objections that Bonfield
notes (and that have not already been discussed in this Article) are the
following: Legislative vetoes might unduly strengthen the legislature’s
authority over the executive by removing the governor’s constitutional
veto power and weakening his bargaining position.283 Special interest

rules through passage of a joint resolution).
279. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
280. H.R., Transcript of Debates, 95th Gen. Assemb., 299th Sess. (Ill. Jan. 8, 2009) (statement
of Andrew P. Morriss, Professor, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign), http://www.ilga.gov/house/
committees/95Documents/Committee%20Exhibit%2050.pdf.
281. See Jerry L. Anderson & Christopher Poyner, A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Iowa’s Administrative Rules Review Committee Procedure, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 27 (2012).
There is a voluminous literature on policy issues surrounding the legislative veto. See Frickey,
supra note 151, at 1259 n.93.
282. BONFIELD, supra note 189; see also Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1991) (offering similar
arguments and observations).
283. BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 507; see also Gen. Assembly of State of N.J. v. Byrne, 448
A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982) (“Broad legislative veto power deters executive agencies in the
performance of their constitutional duty to enforce existing laws. Its vice lies not only in its
exercise but in its very existence. Faced with potential paralysis from repeated uses of the veto
that disrupt coherent regulatory schemes, officials may retreat from the execution of their
responsibilities. They will resort to compromises with legislative committees aimed at drafting
rules that the current Legislature will find acceptable.”).
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groups will be more likely to exercise undue influence over legislative
committees that have veto power over agency rulemaking.284 Agencies
that draft rules in the shadow of legislative vetoes may end up more
influenced by legislators than by the public rulemaking process.285 The
public might be misled about who is ultimately responsible for rules that
are promulgated by agencies but that require legislative approval.286
Allowing a small committee to exercise a veto creates the likelihood
that a small number of legislators will “effectively subvert” the will of
the entire legislative body.287 Legislators may be lulled into making
overly broad delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies out of a
“false sense of security” that the legislature will be able to adequately
oversee the rules that are actually promulgated.288 The failure to veto a
rule might have the unanticipated consequence of convincing the courts
(“consciously or unconsciously”) that the legislature deemed the agency
rule to be lawfully promulgated.289 And finally, too many “hurdles” to
rulemaking might encourage agencies to eschew rulemaking altogether
“in favor of law making by ad hoc adjudication.”290
284. A committee or legislative veto of rules “may be more susceptible to undue influence by
special interest groups seeking action inconsistent with the political will of the entire body politic
and contrary to the public interest, than is a veto . . . by the usual statutory enactment process
involving both houses and the governor.” BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 508. A pre-Chadha
study conducted in the 1980s by Marcus E. Ethridge found that states with legislative review
schemes over agency action led to “probable changes in the substance of public policies” adopted
by the agencies because of the legislative oversight, and that “potential political influence is an
important determinant of committee action.” Marcus E. Ethridge, Consequences of Legislative
Review of Agency Regulations in Three U.S. States, 9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 161, 175 (1984).
285. The legislative veto may have the unintended consequence of “inducing administrators to
develop rules primarily or exclusively on the basis of contacts with legislators rather than on the
basis of public rule-making proceedings.” BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 509.
286. Vesting a veto over agency rules in the legislative branch may create a false impression
with the public that the legislature is responsible for the “legality and desirability of all rules of
all agencies.” Id. at 510.
287. Id. at 510–11. This is a concern that is somewhat mitigated by the availability in Illinois
of a General Assembly joint resolution override of the JCAR veto. But even so, the committee or
full legislative veto would in at least some instances potentially be overriding the will of an
earlier General Assembly that had passed the original authorizing legislation.
288. Id. at 512.
289. Id. at 513. In Illinois, the courts typically do not find probative the failure of the General
Assembly to pass legislation. See S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 556 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) (“[L]egislative inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable
inferences may be drawn from such inaction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 540
(“The legislature can not express its will by a failure to legislate. The act of refusing to enact a
law . . . has utterly no legal effect, and thus has utterly no place in a serious discussion of the
law.” (internal quotation makes and citation omitted)). Whether the courts would view the failure
of the General Assembly to pass a veto by joint resolution remains a matter of speculation.
290. BONFIELD, supra note 189, at 513.
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Bonfield’s observations about potential drawbacks to legislative veto
schemes merit serious reflection, and might on their own reasonably
dissuade a legislature from seeking to establish the legislative veto if
none had previously existed in law. Illinois, though, has more than
three decades’ worth of experience with various types of legislative
vetoes of agency rulemaking. Therefore, empirical and qualitative
analysis of the manner in which the state’s legislative veto scheme has
or has not been successful—with special attention to the problems that
Bonfield suggests might come about—would be of value before a
constitutional amendment is pursued.291 Of particular interest is
whether JCAR vetoes have historically been issued because of policy
disagreements with agencies or because the agencies truly appear to
have acted beyond their statutory authority.292
Of course, there are other ways that JCAR could perform an
important oversight function without being given veto power or
requiring amendment to the constitution. Many of these alternatives
were in fact offered for consideration by JCAR itself in its early years,
when the committee pondered ways to supplement its initial informand-advise powers.293 Among the least controversial was JCAR’s
suggestion that agencies should be required to consider the economic
impact of their proposed rules, and that JCAR review could be
expanded to include economic considerations.294 An expansion of
review authority along these lines would of course raise no
constitutional issues.
Another promising proposal that would probably survive
constitutional scrutiny would be to shift the burden of proof to the
agency in any court challenge of a rule to which JCAR had objected.295
Although it might be challenged as an unconstitutional encroachment on
the powers of the judicial branch, the constitutionality of such burden
shifting has been upheld in other states296 and is recommended by the

291. For a study addressing some of these issues, see generally Marc D. Falkoff, An Empirical
Critique of JCAR and the Legislative Veto in Illinois, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming spring
2016).
292. See Carl A. Auerbach, Bonfield on State Administrative Rulemaking: A Critique, 71
MINN. L. REV. 543, 568 (1987) (chief critic of Bonfield nonetheless agreeing “that the committee
should not be given authority to object to an agency rule on policy grounds”).
293. 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 393–96.
294. Id. at 393.
295. Id. at 393–94.
296. See, e.g., Iowa Dealers Ass’n v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1981).
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drafters of the Model State Administrative Procedures Act.297 One
benefit of such a proposal would be that the view of the current
legislature (or at least of a legislative committee) would be known to the
court and might have some marginal effect on its determination of
whether an agency is or is not acting beyond its authority. Likewise,
there might be some deterrent effect on agencies, though an agency’s
certainty that it is acting within its authority would presumably prevent
it from being dissuaded from placing the regulation into effect.298
CONCLUSION
Eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court will rule on the
constitutionality of JCAR and legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking.
When that day arrives, the court will almost surely conclude, in accord
with the courts in nearly every jurisdiction to have addressed the same
question, that the legislative veto violates the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of the state constitution. In the meantime, to
avoid the chaos that might follow such a ruling, the General Assembly
should consider alternatives to the legislative veto that will be more
likely to survive constitutional scrutiny while still providing meaningful
legislative oversight of agency rulemaking.

297. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 3-204 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1981).
298. Some of the other proposals from the 1979 report would, like the legislative veto
provision that has been discussed in this Article, also be of dubious lawfulness. For example, the
proposal to allow JCAR to require agency rulemaking would, as JCAR itself acknowledged,
raises “[v]ery serious constitutional questions.” 1979 JCAR REPORT, supra note 49, at 396.
Because JCAR could force the agency to adopt whatever rules JCAR wanted, the agency and any
statutory delegation of rulemaking authority to the agency would be illusory and political lines of
accountability would be entirely obscured. Other problematic proposals include those that would
allow for non-permanent action by JCAR, such as the temporary suspension of existing rules, the
suspension of emergency rules, and a pre-approval requirement for new permanent and
emergency rules before they could become effective. Finally, a related proposal would give
JCAR some coercive power beyond merely recommending to the General Assembly the passage
of corrective legislation would be to authorize JCAR to initiate lawsuits against agencies deemed
to have acted beyond their statutory authority. Id.

